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CHOPPING DOWN THE FRUIT TREE: CARUTH CORP. v.
UNITED STATES APPLIES ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME
DOCTRINE TO GIFT OF STOCK BETWEEN
DECLARATION AND RECORD DATES
The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property, is an act
which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet, there is perhaps no
legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a
predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice.
-James Madison, 1787*
INTRODUCTION
The primary function of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") is to impose a
federal tax on income. While the Code defines what is income,1 what is not
income,' when income is reported,3 and how income is reported,4 it provides
little guidance as to who should pay tax on the income.5 The only relevant
Code provision is section 61, which provides that gross income includes "all
income from whatever source derived." 6 Justice Holmes, in the landmark case
of Lucas v. Earl,' construed section 618 as taxing income to those who earn it.
Throughout the years, taxpayers have attempted to assign income in an ef-
fort to decrease their tax liability.9 Generally, assignments of income take two
forms:" (1) situations where a taxpayer in a high income tax bracket attempts
to shift income to a taxpayer in a lower income tax bracket, usually a family
member, so that the income is taxed at the donee's lower rate;" and (2) situa-
* THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 132 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
I. I.R.C. §§ 61, 71-90 (1988).
2. Id. §§ 101-135.
3. Id. §9 441-444, 451-483.
4. Id. §9 446-448.
5. Soil, Intra-family Assignments: Attribution and Realization of Income (pt. 2), 7 TAx L.
REV. 61, 67 (1951).
6. I.R.C. § 61 (1988).
7. 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
8. The counterpart to § 61 in 1930, the time Lucas was decided, was § 213(a) of the Revenue
Act of 1918. Under § 213(a), net income included "income derived from salaries, wages, or com-
pensation for personal services . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form paid." Lucas, 281 U.S.
at 114 (quoting § 213(a)).
9. Rice, Judicial Trends in Gratuitous Assignments to Avoid Federal Income Taxes, 64 YALE
L.J. 991, 991 (1955).
10. Estate of Applestein v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 331, 342-43 (1983).
1I. E.g., Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1961) (father transferred
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tions where a taxpayer donates property to a charity in an attempt to avoid
the tax on the income from the property while taking a charitable deduction
for the market value of the property.12
In both situations, the assignment of income doctrine 3 operates to tax the
donor on the income despite the fact that it is received by the donee. In Lucas,
Justice Holmes stated that the fruits cannot be "attributed to a different tree
from that on which they grew. 14  This "apparently innocent figure of
speech"' 5 imposed on the law of taxation the ever-present fruit-tree meta-
phor.16 In terms of the metaphor, the owner of the income-producing property
(the tree) is taxed on the income (the fruit), even though the owner never
receives the income. The corollary to the metaphor is that if the owner trans-
fers the "tree," he is not taxed on any "fruit" that ripens after the gift."
stock after dividend was declared to child); Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945)
(husband donated successful court judgment to wife and children); Usher v. Commissioner, 45
T.C. 205 (1965) (taxpayer entered into binding contract to sell stock to third party and then, prior
to actual sale, donated stock to family member); Townsend v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 830 (1962)
(taxpayer sold stock to third party, then donated sales contract to family members who were to
receive the sales proceeds); Cook v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 908 (1945) (father donated stock to
sons after the corporation adopted a plan of liquidation); see Estate of Applestein, 80 T.C. at 342.
In all of the above cases, the donor was taxable on the income because he donated the right to
receive income after it had ripened.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 diminished the utility of this type of assignment of income in two
ways. First, the so-called "Kiddie Tax" rules tax a child at his parent's tax rate for unearned
income such as interest, rent, and dividend income. I.R.C. § I(i) (1988); see Baetz, The Indefen-
sible Kiddie Tax, 126 TR. & EST. 27 (1987); Schmolka, The Kiddie Tax under the Tax Reform
Act of 1986: In Need of Reform While the Ink Was Still Wet, 11 REV. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS 99
(1987). Second, the 1986 Act contained only two tax brackets for individual taxpayers. I.R.C. § 1
(1988). However, the 1990 amendments to the tax laws create a third tax bracket that revives, to
some extent, the utility of this type of assignment. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-508, § 1101, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 1388.
12. E.g., Jones v. United States, 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976) (donor donated stock to charity
after the corporation adopted a plan of liquidation); Kinsey v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d
Cir. 1973) (same); Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972) (same); see Estate of
Applestein, 80 T.C. at 343. In each of these cases, the court held the donor taxable on the income
because the right to the income ripened before the time of the gift.
13. For an excellent discussion of the assignment of income doctrine, see Lyon & Eustice, As-
signment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the PG, Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 293
(1962).
14. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. I11, 115 (1930).
15. Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 13 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 1, 15 (1961).
16. D. POSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS § 5.05, at 282 (1983) (stating that
"when Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes planted the tree in Lucas v. Earl, he doubtless did not
know how great a tree would grow, how far its branches would reach, and where its fruits would
fall"); Molloy, Some Tax Aspects of Corporate Distributions In Kind. 6 TAX L. REV. 57, 61
(1950) (stating that Lucas gave "rise to a truly lamentable host of horticultural metaphors").
17. See, e.g., Teschner, Anticipation of Income, 41 IND. L.J. 587, 588-89 (1966). The donor,
however, is taxed on fruit that was already ripe at the time of the transfer. The ripened fruit
constitutes income that has been realized and, therefore, is taxable. In reality, the donor is trans-
ferring a separate right to income along with the income-producing property.
[Vol. 40:845
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More often than not, the metaphor is substituted for sound legal analysis.18
One commentator has suggested that judges use the fruit-tree metaphor be-
cause they are not comfortable with the tax laws, and therefore, "search for a
property concept which could constitute a tree capable of being trans-
planted." 19 By using this metaphor, judges can identify an income-producing
"tree," and then restrict their inquiry to whether the "tree" was transplanted,
in which case the tax burden is shifted to the donee, or whether only the
"fruit" was transferred, in which case the donor remains taxable.20
The fruit-tree metaphor simply is not adequate .to analyze all situations.
While labeling an item as "fruit" or "tree" may provide quick answers, the
distinction between the "fruit" and the "tree" is often tenuous.2 ' As a result,
18. This view has been echoed by several commentators:
The metaphor has been substituted for rational analysis by courts and commentators
to the point where a critic in this area cannot see the forest for the fruit trees. Meta-
phors lead nowhere: the number and extent of tax avoidance devices that have been
employed here make a more rational analytical approach imperative if rational results
are to be achieved.
Rice, supra note 9, at 991. See Brown, supra note 15, at 15 ("Beware the metaphor! Of all the
anodynes for the pains of thought, it is the most seductive, the most misleading."). Justice Car-
dozo's admonition of metaphors is appropriate in this context: "Metaphors in law are to be nar-
rowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey
v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
19. Brown, supra note 15, at 15; see also Davies, The Shifting of Family Income For Income
Tax Purposes, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 281, 305 (1960); Del Cotto, "Property" in the Capital Asset
Definition: Influence of "Fruit and Tree," 15 BUFFALO L. REV. I, 7 (1965) (noting that Holmes'
metaphor introduced the property concept into tax law); Durant, Who Should Be Taxed on the
Income From Property Owned by One Person, Legally or Equitably, but in the Legal Possession
of Another?, 7 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 920, 920 (1949) (noting that courts explain tax consequences
in terms of property).
20. Brown, supra note 15, at 15. The court in Caruth fell prey to the fruit-tree metaphor in
phrasing the issue in the case as "whether the fruit has been attributed to a different tree, or
whether instead the entire tree has been transplanted." Ca'ruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d
644, 649 (5th Cir. 1989).
21. This distinction can become blurred in certain instances. For example, in Lum v. Commis-
sioner, 147 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1945), the taxpayer assigned to his wife the rents from one lease
and the "rights as landlord" in another lease. Id. at 357. The court held that the donor assigned
"fruit" in the first lease and the "tree" in the second lease because the "rights as landlord" consti-
tuted an interest in property. Id.
There are other examples of the misleading tendency of this metaphor. For instance, in Helver-
ing v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), the Supreme Court held that the assignment of renewal
contracts for insurance commissions was an assignment of income rather than an assignment of
property. Id. at 125. On the other hand, oil brokerage contracts are considered income-producing
property. Carter v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 364, 370 (1947) (holding that assignments of commis-
sions received in return for prior services was an assignment of property); see Tye, Corporate
Distributions-Some Current Trends, 4 TAx L. REv. 459, 465-66 (1949).
The assignment of a lease is generally considered income. See United States v. Shafto, 246 F.2d
338 (4th Cir. 1957) (holding that the assignment of a five-year lease was ineffective to shift tax on
rental income); Gait v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954) (holding that the assignment
of a twenty-year lease was ineffective to shift tax on rental income); Rev. Rul. 58-337, 1958-2
C.B. 13. Recall that in Lum v. Commissioner, the court considered the assignment of a lease with
all of the donor/lessor's "rights as landlord" to be an assignment of property and not an assign-
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the metaphor has limited utility and sometimes produces odd results in com-
plex cases. In fact, in some situations, the person who owns the "tree" is not
taxed,2 '2 while in others, the person who transfers the "tree" is taxed."'
An assignment of stock with a dividend does not fall squarely into either
category, "fruit" or "tree."'" The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit recently addressed the question of who should be taxed on a dividend
where a donor donates stock to a donee after a dividend has been declared but
before the record date.2 5 In Caruth Corp. v. United States,26 'the court held
that the tax burden should fall on the donee.17 The court succumbed to the
fruit-tree metaphor and decided that since the donor gave away the stock (the
tree), he should no longer be taxed on the dividend. 8 In so doing, the court
ignored the fact that the dividend had sufficiently "ripened" at the time of the
gift so as to hold the donor taxable.
This Note examines the Caruth court's decision and that court's erroneous
approach to the tax consequences of a gift of stock after a dividend is declared
but prior to the record date. The Background section begins with a review of
the assignment of income doctrine. According to this doctrine, a person who
earns income cannot escape its taxation by assigning it to someone else. Since
Caruth was a case of relative first impression, the Background section draws
ment of income. Lum, 147 F.2d at 357.
The assignment of royalty contracts also illustrates the difficulty in distinguishing between in-
come and income-producing property. An author, P.G. Wodehouse, assigned half his interest in
manuscripts and all related rights to his wife. The Second Circuit held that the author assigned
the income-producing property, and therefore, the assignment was effective to shift the tax to his
wife. Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1949). On the same facts, the Fourth
Circuit held that the author had assigned income, and therefore, the author/donor remained tax-
able. Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1949); see also 3 Fed. Tax Serv. (MB)
§ A:4.103[8] (1990); Ruden, Assignment of Income, Though Difficult, Can Be An Effective In-
come Shifting Tool, 4 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 74, 74 (1962) (discussing Wodehouse decisions); Shine,
Some Tax Problems of Authors and Artists, 13 TAX L. REv. 439, 452-53 (1958) (same).
22. Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962) (holding a taxpayer whose efforts created
the right to receive income in the form of a winning sweepstakes ticket not taxable on the income
because the taxpayer never had a right to receive it himself); J. CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 146, at 449 (2d ed. 1973); Teschner, supra note 17, at 589 & n.6.
23. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (holding that a corporation that
negotiated and pre-arranged a sale of assets was taxable for the proceeds of the sale even though
it distributed those assets to shareholders prior to the actual sale); Teschner, supra note 17, at 589
& n.5.
24. The court in the subject opinion recognized that the stock in Caruth was a "peculiar asset."
Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 645 (5th Cir. 1989).
25. With regard to a dividend, four significant dates occur: (1) the declaration date-the date
the corporation determines that it will pay a dividend, (2) the record date-the shareholder of the
stock on this date is entitled to receive the dividend, (3) the payment date-the date the corpora-
tion pays the dividend to the shareholder, and (4) the date of actual receipt-the date the share-
holder receives the dividend from the corporation. Note, Corporations-Dividends-To Whom
Payable When Record Date is Given, 7 OHIO ST. L.J. 437 (1941).
26. 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989).
27. Id. at 651.
28. Id. at 649.
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analogies to 'cases applying the assignment of income doctrine to both liquidat-
ing proceeds and contingent contracts because the courts in these cases uti-
lized a different analysis than the court used in Caruth. Finally, the Back-
ground section surveys the case law on the assignment of stock and dividends.
Next, the Note focuses on the decision in Caruth. The Analysis section first
discusses how the Caruth court misapplied the assignment of income doctrine.
This section then provides an alternative analysis and holding. Finally, the Im-
pact section identifies the future applications of Caruth in terms of tax avoid-
ance opportunities.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Assignment of Income Doctrine
Generally, assignments fall into three categories. First, a taxpayer can per-
form services and assign his compensation for these services to another person
or entity. Second, a taxpayer who owns an income-producing property can as-
sign the income that is generated from the property while still retaining the
property. Third, the taxpayer can assign the income-producing property itself
to another person or entity. All three of these assignments can take the form
of either a gift or sale. The following three subsections separately examine
each type of assignment in the form of a gift. Since the same principles apply
to all three types of assignments when made for consideration, this secti6n
concludes with a discussion of the consequences of a sale.
1. Assignment of Income from Services
The assignment of income doctrine was introduced in 1930 by Justice
Holmes in Lucas v. Earl.29 In Lucas, a husband and wife formed a contract
which provided that all future earnings of both parties were to be owned
equally. 0 This contract had the effect of shifting half of the husband's income
to the wife, who previously had no income."' Despite the assignment to his
wife, the Supreme Court held that the husband was required to pay tax on the
full amount of his earnings.8 2 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes gave
birth to the now famous fruit-tree metaphor: one who earns income cannot
escape the tax by "anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully
devised . . . by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on
29. 281 U.S. Ill (1930).
30. Id. at 113-14. The couple did not form the contract in order to avoid paying income tax
since the contract was created in 1901, prior to the enactment of the income tax laws. Id. at 114.
Nevertheless, Justice Holmes stated that the absence of a tax-avoidance motive was irrelevant. Id.
at 115.
31. Under the current Code, a spouse, like Guy Earl, could accomplish his income-splitting
objective by filing a joint return. I.R.C. § 6013 (1988). In effect, the joint return provision in the
Code that permits spouses to report income jointly can be regarded as a statutory assignment of
income. Ruden, supra note 21, at 75.
32. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 115.
1991]
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which they grew." 88
The Lucas case firmly established that income from services is taxed to the
person who performed the services.8' The fact that the donee had a legal right
to receive the income is immaterial.8 5 The decision instead focused on who
earned the income.86
The timing of the assignment, whether prior to or following the performance
of services, is also immaterial." In Lucas, the assignment occurred before the
33. Id. Technically, the metaphor was not truly applicable in the Lucas case, unless the hus-
band was considered the "tree" and his earnings the "fruit." In subsequent cases dealing with
income from property, the metaphor is more readily applicable. Holmes could not have imagined
that his offhand reference to fruits and trees would be so widely used in later cases to explain and
analyze the assignment of income doctrine. See D. POSIN, supra note 16, § 5.05, at 282 ("[W]hen
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes planted the tree in Lucas v. Earl, he doubtless did not know how
great a tree would grow, how far its branches would reach, and where its fruits would fall.").
34. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930). The person who performed the services that gen-
erated the right to receive income cannot escape taxation by assigning the right to income. J.
CHOMMIE, supra note 22, at 449; 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation 5382 (1985); Fed. Tax.
Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) I J-8231; Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) § A:4.104; Durant, supra note
19, at 923; Lee & Bader, Contingent Income Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Cor-
relative Adjustments and Clearer Reflection of Income. 12 J. CORP. L. 137, 187 (1987); Ruden,
supra note 21, at 74; Shores, Reexamining the Relationship Between Capital Gain and the As-
signment of Income, 13 IND. L. REv. 463, 499 (1980); Soil, Intra-Family Assignments: Attribu-
tion and Realization of Income (pt. 1), 6 TAX L. REV. 435, 438 (1951).
35. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114. The Court recognized that the wife in Lucas had a legal right to
receive the income. Id. It also recognized that the right to the income vested after the assignment.
Id. at 115. However, the Court avoided deciding the case based on "attenuated subtleties" and
decided instead that the husband had realized income. Id. at 114-15.
36. Lee & Bader, supra note 34, at 187. The concept of "earned" has a special significance in
the area of tax law. For a more detailed discussion, see infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
Where the donor assigns compensation income (wages, salaries, commissions, etc.), the person
who "earns" the income is easily identified as the person who performs the services. However,
when income from property is assigned, it is more difficult to determine the person who earned it.
See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 389 n.372. Compare Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 579
(1937) (holding that donee earned income where donor assigned undivided, lifetime interest in
income from trust) with Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941) (holding that donor earned
income where donor assigned one year's worth of income from trust) and Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940) (holding that donor earned income where donor assigned interest income from
bond but retained the bond).
37. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); see also M. CHIRELSTEIN. L. DAY & E. OWENS,
TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 436-37 (World Tax Series) (1963) (hereinafter M. CHIREL-
STEIN] (donor taxed on income already accrued); 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation 5382 (1985)
(same); Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) J-8231 (same); Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) §
A:4.104 (same); Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 388-89 (same); Ruden, supra note 21, at 74
(same).
Before Helvering v. Eubank, courts held that Lucas was limited to assignments of future com-
pensation because the donor/earner retained control over the income. E.g. Burnet v. Leininger,
285 U.S. 136 (1932). The donor/earner was viewed as having control over the income because
any future earnings were contingent on the donor continuing to perform the services. See Soil,
supra note 34, at 438 (quoting Matchette v. Helvering, 81 F.2d 73, 74 (2d. Cir. 1936)). The
control rationale was further developed and applied in later cases such as Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1940). See infra notes 76-77.
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taxpayer performed the services, and therefore, it was an assignment of future
income." This same principle readily applies if the taxpayer assigns income
previously earned.3 9 In Helvering v. Eubank, the taxpayer assigned commis-
sions from insurance contracts.'0 The services that created the right to the
renewal commissions had been previously rendered by the insurance agent."'
The Supreme Court held that assignments of the previously earned insurance
commissions were taxable to the donor." Therefore, a taxpayer may not assign
income from future or previously earned income.
The Lucas case has been followed in many areas. Thus, the wage earner/
donor remains the proper taxpayer after an assignment of wages,"3 pensions,""
and commissions.45
2. Assignment of Income from Property
While Lucas held that a taxpayer could not shift the tax burden on compen-
sation income, it did not address the consequences of an assignment of income
from property. Income from property usually takes the form of interest, divi-
dends, annuities, trust income, or royalties.' 6 The Supreme Court promptly
extended the Lucas rationale to income from property in the landmark Helver-
ing v. Horst decision.47
The Horst decision established that where the donor retains the property
and assigns income earned from that property, the income is taxable to the
38. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 113-14.
39. Eubank, 311 U.S. at 122.
40. Id. at 124.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 125. The Court simply stated that the case was indistinguishable from Horst and
offered no further analysis. Id. The fact that the renewal commissions were contingent on custom-
ers renewing the insurance policies apparently did not have a bearing on the result. For further
discussion of the treatment of assignments of contingent contracts, see infra notes 154-74 and
accompanying text.
43. Johnson v. United States, 698 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding a basketball player taxa-
ble on his earnings even though they were paid to a third party); Amsler v. Commissioner, 51
T.C.M. (CCH) 978 (1986) (holding a musician taxable on his earnings even though paid to a
trust); Erskine v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 147 (1932) (holding an employee that assigned stock
option after he exercised the option taxable on the option); see Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res.
Inst. Am.) J-8232.
44. Duran v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1941) (holding an employee that assigned
pension benefits taxable on the benefits); Helvering v. Knapp, 121 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1941) (hold-
ing a taxpayer that assigned pension benefits to a trust taxable on the benefits).
45. McIver v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 719 (1977) (holding a real estate broker that
shared commission from sale of property with another broker taxable on the full amount of the
commissions).
46. Ruden, supra note 21, at 74.
47. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). In terms of the fruit-tree metaphor, the donor
held onto the "tree" (property) while giving away the "fruit" (income). Since the "fruit" is attrib-
utable to the donor's "tree," the donor must pay the tax on the "fruit." In the earlier, less complex
cases, this metaphor adequately explained the assignment of income doctrine, which in return
explains its early appeal to judges.
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donor.4" In Horst, a father gave his son detachable coupons 49 from a bond
shortly before their due date but retained ownership of the bond. 50 The son
collected the coupons at maturity.5 1 The Supreme Court held that because the
father retained the property, he remained taxable on the income received by
the son. 2 The Court found no adequate basis for distinguishing between a gift
of salary or commissions and a gift of interest coupons.53
The Court reasoned that the gift of the coupons constituted a realization of
the income.5' This is an important issue because a taxpayer cannot be taxed
on a gain from property until he "realizes" that gain. Income is realized when
some particular event occurs that makes it convenient to determine the
amount of gain. 5 Although a sale or exchange is the more common type of
realization," a the Court stated that a taxpayer could also realize income when
he completes the last step towards satisfaction of his economic gain.57 This last
step of the enjoyment of income in Horst was satisfying the desire to benefit
the donee-son by transferring the income to him in the form of the coupon.58
By possessing control over the right to dispose of the income, the father real-
ized the income. 59
48. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
49. Coupon bonds are bonds in which the holder collects his interest by detaching a "coupon"
from the bond and presenting it to the debtor for payment.
50. Horst, 311 U.S. at 114.
51. id.
52. Id. at 115.
53. Id. at 120.
54. Id. at 115.
55. Id.
56. Harrow, Helvering v. Horst: Some Notes on Recent Applications of the Doctrine, 6 INST.
FED. TAX'N 1127, 1128 (1948) (realization is usually in the form of the sale or exchange of the
property).
57. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940). The Court stated that the rule governing
realization is "only one of postponement of the tax to the final event of enjoyment of the income,
usually the receipt of it by the taxpayer, and not one of exemption from taxation where the enjoy-
ment is consummated by some event other than the taxpayer's personal receipt of money or prop-
erty." Id.
58. 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 5.09, at 5-54 (rev. perm. ed. 1987).
59. Horst, 311 U.S. at 117. The Court in Horst identified two separate property rights in a
bond: the right to receive the principal at maturity and the right to receive interest payments upon
presentment of the coupons. Id. at 115. Since the father completely gave away his right to receive
the interest from the coupons, one might wonder why the father should have been taxed on a
property right with which he completely parted. The Court's rationale was that the taxpayer real-
ized the income by having the power to dispose of it: "(tihe power to dispose of income is the
equivalent of ownership of it." Id. at 118. Under the Court's theory, the gift of the income-pro-
ducing property also constitutes realization since the taxpayer possessed the power to dispose of it.
Since the Court considered the right to receive the interest payments a separate property right,
then the disposition of that property right, under the Court's theory, arguably should shift the tax
burden to the donee. However, the Court's theory proves too much since a gift of property clearly
is not taxable to the transferor. I.R.C. § 102 (1988) ("Gross income does not include the value of
property acquired by gift .... ").
The implication of the "enjoyment of income" rationale is that the assignment is the taxable
event. Despite the strong language in the case, Horst has not been interpreted as considering the
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The rationale of Horst was that by disposing of the income as he wished,
the donor enjoyed the income as much as if he collected the income himself
and then subsequently transferred it to his son.60 The donor's transfer of the
right to receive interest as a gift constituted a use of economic gain equivalent
to the expenditure of money.6 The use of this economic gain, whether an ex-
penditure of money or the transfer of a gift, is the enjoyment of income: "Even
though he never receives the money, he derives money's worth from the dispo-
sition . . . .The enjoyment of the economic benefit . . .is realized as com-
pletely as it would have been if he had collected the interest in dollars and
expended them." 62
Thus, the Court defined earned income based on the property owner's "en-
joyment of income." The Court stated that the purpose of the taxation laws is
the "taxation of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to
receive it and enjoy the benefit of it when paid."" Simply stated, if the donor
retains control over the income-producing property while assigning the right to
income to someone else, he remains liable for the tax on the income from the
property. 4 The key inquiry under the Horst doctrine, therefore, is who owned
or controlled the income-producing property when the income was earned.
The Horst doctrine also applies to interest,65 rent," dividends, 67 partnership
gift a taxable event. Austin v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 767
(1947); Colby v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 536 (1941); see also Commissioner v. First State Bank
of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir.) ("The acquisition of the right to receive payment of
a bad debt is not necessarily a taxable event; and therefore the realization of the gain by the
assignor is not deemed to occur until thedebt is paid to the assignee."), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867
(1948); Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 355 n.244. These later decisions reasoned that the
donor realizes income under the Horst doctrine when the donee actually receives the income. Lee
& Bader, supra note 34, at 188 & n.332.
60. Although Horst considers disposing of the income realization, disposing of the property as
one wishes is not considered realization for tax purposes although it may result in a similar "en-
joyment" of the property. I.R.C. § 102 (1988) (stating that gross income does not include prop-,
erty acquired by gift). Thus, although Horst broadened the concept of realization to include the
gift of income, see Shine, supra note 21, at 452, it did not, go so far as to broaden realization to
include the gift of property.
61. Horst, 311 U.S. at 117.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 119.
64. This is the prototype fruit-tree situation: where the donor keeps the tree and gives away the
fruit, he is taxed on the fruit whenever it ripens. Essentially, the donor must include in her income
any interest that had accrued as of the date of the gift. Rev. Rul. 58-275, 1958-1 C.B. 22 (stating
that a cash basis donor must include interest income on the accrual basis); 34 AM. JUR. 2D Fed-
eral Taxation 1 5389 (1985). This effectively puts all taxpayers on the accrual basis for purposes
of determining interest income. See Harrow, supra note 56, at 1128.
65. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). The Supreme Court held the donor taxable on
interest earned after the assignment of the right to income because he retained ownership of the
income-producing property. Id. at 118.
66. The donor is taxed on the rental income if he assigns the right to rent money while retain-
ing a reversionary interest in the rental property. United States v. Joliet & C.R. Co., 315 U.S. 44
(1941); United States v. Shafto, 246 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1957) (holding that an assignment of a
five-year lease was ineffective to shift tax on rental income); Gait v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41
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(7th Cir. 1954) (holding that an assignment of a twenty-year lease was ineffective to shift tax on
rental income); Ward v. Commissioner, 58 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1932); Rev. Rul. 58-337, 1958-2
C.B. 13 (holding that assignment of a 10 year lease absent assignment of reversion constituted an
assignment of income); see also 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation 5391 (1985) (assignment of
rent shifts tax burden only where assignee gets ownership interest in property); Fed. Tax. Coordi-
nator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) J-8266 (same); Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) § A:4.103[7] (same); Lyon &
Eustice, supra note 13, at 330-31 (same). The donee is taxed on the rental income if the donor
assigns the rental property itself. Bonkowski v. Commissioner, 458 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1972).
Some disagreement exists over who is the proper taxpayer where the lessor assigns his "rights as
landlord" as well as the lease. In Lum v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 356 (3d. Cir. 1945), the lessor
assigned three leases: in one assignment, he assigned merely the right to receive rent; in the other
two, he assigned the lease with all his "rights as landlord." Id. at 357. The Third Circuit held that
the donor/lessor was liable for the rents on the first lease because he merely transferred income
while retaining the income-producing property. Id. The court held, however, that the other two
leases were property interests under state law, and thus, effective to shift the burden of paying
taxes to the assignee. Id.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit held on similar facts that the donor/lessor made an assignment
of income regardless of local law, and thus, taxed the assignor for the rents. Shafto, 246 F.2d at
338; Rev. Ruling 58-337, 1958-2 C.B. 13; see also Gait, 216 F.2d at 41 (assignment of twenty-
year lease ineffective to shift tax burden). The courts in Shafto and Gait ruled that the income-
producing property was the rental property and the lease merely evidenced the right to receive
income. Shafto, 246 F.2d at 341; Gait, 216 F.2d at 47; see also Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at
331.
67. The donor is responsible for the tax on dividends if he assigns the dividends but keeps the
stock. Busch v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1945) (holding a trust beneficiary taxable
on future dividends assigned to creditor); Hyman v. Nunan, 143 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding
a donor taxable on the dividends where donor assigned right to future dividends without transfer-
ring the stock); Newman v. Commissioner, I T.C. 921 (1943) (holding a donor taxable on the
dividends where donor assigned right to future dividends without transferring the stock); Estate of
Holmes v. Commissioner, I T.C. 508 (1943) (holding a donor taxable on rights to accumulated
dividends donated 15 days before maturity where donor held stock); see 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal
Taxation 1 5395 (1985); Harrow, supra note 56, at 1130; Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 362;
Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) § A:4.103[61; Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) J-8284. If the
donor transfers the stock but retains a right to the dividends, then the donor is taxed on the
dividend income. Hemingway v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 96 (1965).
When the donor transfers the stock, the issue arises as to who is taxed on dividends already
declared. This was precisely the issue in Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir.
1989).
68. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) (holding a husband taxable on partnership
income assigned to wife even though wife made a capital investment in the partnership); Lusthaus
v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946) (same); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932) (holding
a husband, who was a partner in a firm, taxable on his share of partnership income where he
assigned future partnership income to his wife); see also Bruton, Family Partnerships and the
Income Tax-The Culbertson Chapter, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 143 (1949); Paul, Partnerships in Tax
Avoidance, 13 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121 (1945); Veron, Taxation of the Income of Family Part-
nerships, 59 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1945); Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) 11 J-8253 to
J-8256.
69. Generally, if the donor assigns royalty income while retaining the underlying licensing
agreement, the income is taxed to the donor. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948);
Strauss v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1948); Lewis v. Rothensis, 138 F.2d 129 (3d. Cir.
1943); Eckel v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 147 (1974); Hopkins v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.
160 (1950).
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However, the assignment of the license agreement is an assignment of income-producing prop-
erty, which shifts the tax liability to the donee. Commissioner v. Reece, 233 F.2d 30 (Ist Cir.
1956); Kuzmick v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 288 (1948).
One set of facts gave rise to two interesting and contrasting cases. An author, P.G. Wodehouse,
assigned half his interest in manuscripts and all related rights to his wife. The Second Circuit held
that the author assigned the income-producing property, and therefore, the assignment was effec-
tive. Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1949). On the same facts, the Fourth
Circuit held that the author assigned income, and therefore, taxed the author/donor. Wodehouse
v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1950); see also Ruden, supra note 21, at 74 (discussing
the Wodehouse decisions); Shine, supra note 21, at 452-54 (same); Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) §
A:4.103[8] (same).
70. In Wilkinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 469 (1962), a lawyer purchased a legal contingent
fee contract, worked on the case for seventeen years, and then obtained a favorable judgement. Id.
at 470. Before legal fees were awarded, the lawyer donated his attorney's fee contract to a charity.
Id. Legal fees were in fact awarded and received by the charity. The taxpayer claimed a charita-
ble deduction for the value of the fees donated. However, the taxpayer did not include the fees in
income, claiming that he made a gift of appreciated property. Id. The court disagreed and held
the lawyer taxable on the legal fees. Id. at 474. The court reasoned that the contingent fee con-
tract was not property because the nature of the contract was merely a right to receive the in-
come. Since the lawyer created the right to income with his personal efforts, he had to bear the
tax consequences. Id. at 473-74.
71. In Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937), a life beneficiary of a trust assigned a per-
centage of the future trust income for the full term of the life interest to his child. The Supreme
Court held that the donor made a complete transfer of a property interest. Id. at 13. The Court
stated that "[tihe assignment of the beneficial interest is not the assignment of achose in action
but of the 'right, title, and estate in and to property'. . . . We conclude that the assignments were
valid, that the assignees thereby became the owners of the specified beneficial interests in the
income .. " Id. The portion that he assigned was a property interest which he completely as-
signed to his child. Id.; see also Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir.
1963) (discussing Blair); Del Cotto, supra note 19, at 8 (same). Therefore, the Court held that
the assignment was effective to transfer the tax liability on the income. Blair, 300 U.S. at 14.
The definition of a "property interest" can be elusive. The court in Wood Harmon Corp. re-
jected the argument that the right to future income in that case was a property interest. Wood
Harmon Corp., 311 F.2d at 923. The court, in discussing the assignment in that case, stated:
[This was] not the sort of "transfer of beneficial ownership in property" which trans-
fers the incidence of taxation under Blair v. Commissioner. In any case of an antici-
patory assignment of rights to income, it is not difficult to cloak the assignment so
that it masquerades as a transfer of a property right or capital asset, by arbitrarily
assigning this label to the taxpayer's claim for future income. Wearing this disguise,
even Lucas v. Earl, Horst, and Eubank would come withinthe Blair principle. ...
The appellant's argument therefore proves too much.
Id. at 923 (emphasis in original).
The assignment in Blair is referred to as a "vertical slice" of the future income because the
donor gave away a percentage of the income for every year of the life interest. D. POSIN, supra
note 16, § 5.02, at 269-70; Shores, supra note 34, at 499. In contrast, a "horizontal slice" or
"carved out interest" is the right to receive income for a set number of years less than the full life
term. Id. For example, a right to receive 50% of the trust income for the full term of the trust is a
"vertical slice"; while a right to receive all of the trust income for the next five years is a "horizon-
tal slice."
The Court subsequently limited Blair in Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941). In Schaff-
ner, the Court held that a gift of a one-year beneficial interest in a trust was not a substantial
property interest, and therefore, the donor remained liable for the tax on the income. Id. at 583.
Later cases held that a "horizontal slice" of at least ten years was a sufficient property interest to
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butions from corporations.7 1 With an the assignment of income from property,
the ownership or substantial control of the property, at the time the right to
income is earneds is controlling; the actual receipt of the income is
shift the taxability to the donee. Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Kanne, 172 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1949);
Farkas v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1948); Rev. Rul. 55-38, 1955-1 C.B. 389. The
ten-year period was logical because it coincided with the rules for the creation of a trust under §
673 of the 1954 Code. I.R.C. § 673 (1954); see 1 J MERTENS, supra note 58, § 5.09; Lyon &
Eustice, supra note 13, at 362; Shores, supra note 34, at 499. Under the 1954 version of § 673, a
grantor of a trust could assign income for a period of ten years or greater and avoid the tax on the
income during this period. I.R.C. § 673 (1954).
Under the 1986 revision of § 673, the ten-year period is replaced by a five percent of value rule:
if the donor retains a reversionary interest which has a value that exceeds five percent of the value
of the trust, then he is treated as the owner. I.R.C. § 673 (1986). Presumably, the Internal Reve-
nue Service ("IRS") will continue to apply § 673 by analogy to the assignment of beneficial
interests in trust income.
72. Upon liquidation, the corporation itself might be taxed on previously earned income as-
signed to stockholders. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS V 11.62, at 11-58 (4th ed. 1979); 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation 5387
(1985); Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) .I J-8248 to J-8249. For example, in Floyd v.
Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952), a corporation transferred accounts receivable to a stock-
holder after the corporation adopted a plan of liquidation. Id. at 595. Since the corporation used
the cash basis of accounting, it did not report receivables as income until actually received. In this
case, the receivables were received after the assignment. Id. The court held the corporation's for-
mer shareholder taxable on the accounts receivable because the income was fully earned by the
corporation. Id. at 596. The court used the Horst rationale in stating that the power to dispose of
income is the enjoyment of income, and hence, realization. Id.
Similarly, in Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959), a corporation
assigned notes receivable to a stockholder after the plan of liquidation was adopted. The court
held that the corporation was taxable on accrued interest on the note at the time of the transfer.
Id. at 8.
The Second Circuit followed this reasoning in Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d
918 (2d Cir. 1963). In Wood Harmon, the corporation sold some property prior to liquidation and
was entitled to receive the proceeds from the sale. Id. at 921. The court held that the corporation
was taxable on the income from the sale, even though the income was later recovered by the
stockholder, because the corporation earned the income by performing all the services. Id. at 923.
Similarly, the corporation is taxed on'distributions of earned income even if the distribution is
not pursuant to liquidation: In Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948), a corporation distributed as a dividend notes it had
originally charged off as worthless but which later appeared collectible. Id. at 1005. The case
could have been decided under the tax benefit rule. Under the tax benefit rule, the corporation
must include any note later collected in income. I.R.C. § 22(b)(12) (1952). The corporation at-
tempted to avoid this outcome by distributing the notes to its stockholders before they were col-
lected. See Lee & Bader, supra note 34, at 201; Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 400. Instead,
the court based its decision on the assignment of income doctrine and ruled that the corporation
was taxable on the notes. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d at 1010.
73. The general rules for the transfer of the income-producing property only apply when the
gift is a bona fide transfer. Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) § A:4.103[4]. In contrast, if the donor purports
to give up legal ownership, but retains substantial control over the property after the assignment,
then the donor is treated as the owner and must pay the tax on the income from the property.
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (holding a creator of a short-term trust who retained
substantial control of the administration of the trust was taxable on the trust income). The Code
treats a substantial reversionary interest in the property as evidence of sufficient control; if the
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irrelevant.7 4
3. Assignment of Income-Producing Property
The corollary of Horst is that where the taxpayer parts with ownership of
the income-producing property itself, he is no longer liable for the tax on fu-
ture income. 75 In terms of the language in the Horst decision, the taxpayer no
longer can "enjoy" the income from the property because in addition to not
donor retains a reversionary interest which has a value that exceeds five percent of the value of the
trust, then he is treated as the owner. I.R.C, § 673 (1988). Thus, the grantor of the trust must
retain a very small reversionary interest, less than five percent, in the trust to avoid the taxation
on the income. The IRS will look at substance over form in determining whether a genuine gift
was made. Duarte v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 193 (1965).
The groundwork for Clifford began ten years earlier in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
In Corliss, the taxpayer created a trust that paid income to his wife for life with remainder over to
their children. The taxpayer/grantor retained the right to modify or revoke the trust. In holding
the taxpayer liable for the tax on the income, Justice Holmes stated:
But taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual
command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid ....
The income that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to
enjoy at his own opti6n may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to
enjoy it or not.
Id. at 377. Thus, legal title to property is not necessarily determinative of the proper taxpayer. See
Durant, supra note 19, at 923; see also Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933) (holding the grantor
of trust taxable on trust income used to pay premiums on wife's life insurance policy); Simon v.
Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1328 (1981) (holding mother who exercised control over bank
accounts legally transferred to two minor children taxable on income); Marcello v. Commissioner,
23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1877 (1964) (holding taxpayer who actively operated a bar lounge that he had
transferred to his father-in-law taxable on the income from the bar), aff'd on other grounds, 380
F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1967); Dillon v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 1254 (1935) (holding parent who
controlled property transferred to minor children taxable on income).
The Clifford line of cases and resulting Code sections, I.R.C. §§ 671-677 (1988), can be seen as
both an extension of Horst and a limitation of Blair. Horst held.that if the donor retains the
income-producing property and gives away the income from that property, then he is taxable on
the income. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). Clifford and its progeny extend this result
to situations where the donor retains such control over the property that the donor is effectively
treated as the owner. Clifford, 309 U.S. at 335. On the other hand, Blair held that an assignment
of future income for the entire term of a life estate is a transfer of a property right, and thus,
effective to shift the taxpayer. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). Clifford limited this
principle by requiring the grantor to make an irrevocable assignment for a period of at least ten
years to avoid the tax liability. Clifford, 309 U.S. at 338.
74. Horst, 311 U.S. 112; Blair, 300 U.S. 5; see M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 37, at 438. The
author states that "ownership of the underlying property at the time the income was accruing is
deemed to be more significant for tax purposes than actual receipt of the income after it has
accrued." Id.
75. Blair, 300 U.S. at 13 (holding that a beneficiary of trust who assigned an undivided share
of his life interest was not taxable because he parted with ownership of his property); see, e.g.,
Commissioner v. O'Donnell, 90 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 303 U.S. 370
(1938); see also Ruden, supra note 21, at 74 (transfer of property shifts tax burden to donee); 34
AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation 5381 (1985) (same); Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.)
I J-8217 (same); Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) §§ A:4.103, A:4.104[2] (same).
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receiving the income, he can no longer control the disposition of the income. 6
Since the new owner enjoys.the income, he is the appropriate taxpayer.77
Accordingly, a donor who transfers income-producing property that has ap-
preciated in value does not realize78 the gain attributable to the appreciation.7 9
Rather, the appreciation in value is realized by the donee if he subsequently
sells the property.80 The result is that the donee pays the tax on the apprecia-
tion that occurred while the property was held by the donor and any later
appreciation that occurred while it was held by the donee."1
Although the general rule is that the transfer of the property shifts the tax
liability, 2 the donor remains liable for the tax on any income already earned
at the time of the gift." s The donee is then responsible for taxes on amounts
earned after the assignment. 4 Where the income from property accrues rata-
bly over time, such as interest and rent, the amount accrued at the time of the
gift is taxed to the donor." However, other types of income do not accrue with
76. Of course, if the transferor retains a right to the income and transfers the income-producing
property, then the transferor is still responsible for the tax on the income. Hemingway v. Commis-
sioner, 44 T.C. 96 (1965); see 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation 5381 (1985); Fed. Tax. Coordi-
nator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) I J-8284.
77. See Blair, 300 U.S. at 13.
78. I.R.C. § 102 (1988). Despite the strong language in Horst implying that the assignment
was the taxable event, the case has not been interpreted as considering the gift a taxable event.
See supra note 59.
79. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); White v. Broderick, 104 F. Supp. 213
(D. Kan. 1952); Crowley v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 333 (1960); Estate of Farrier v. Commis-
sioner, 15 T.C. 277 (1950); Seminole Flavor Co. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1215 (1945); see also
M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 37, at 438; 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation 5381 (1985); Fed.
Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) J-8223; Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford,
168 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir.) ("Unrealized appreciation, since it is not taxable, is not covered by
the rule as to anticipatory assignments of income."), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948).
80. The donee's basis in appreciated property received as a gift is the donor's basis in the
property. I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1988). Thus, when the donee sells the property, he will realize the
value of the appreciation.
If the fair market value of the property is less than the transferor's basis, then the donee ac-
quires a dual basis: his basis for purposes of gain is the donor's carryover basis, and his basis for
purposes of loss is the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift. Id.
81. Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) J-8223.
82. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
83. Austin v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947) (holding a payee of note who gratui-
tously transferred note taxable on accrued interest at date of gift); Estate of Holmes v. Commis-
sioner, I T.C. 508, 511-12 (1943); see Rev. Rul. 69-102, 1969-1 CB 32; 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal
Taxation 1 5381; Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 354 n.236; Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res.
Inst. Am.) $ J-8222; Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) § A:4.103[l]; Recent Case, Income Taxation-Donor
of Income-Producing Property Subject to Tax on Accrued Income at Date of Gift, 96 U. PA. L.
REv 282, 282 (1947). In terms of the fruit-tree metaphor, the donor is considered to have trans-
ferred a tree with ripe fruit. Since the fruit is ripe, the donor must pay the tax on it.
84. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. O'Donnell, 90 F.2d
907 (9th Cir. 1937), revd on other grounds, 303 U.S. 370 (1938); see Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) §
A:4.103[4].
85. Jones v. United States, 395 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1968) (holding donor taxable on interest
accrued at time of gift of endowment policies when received by donee); Austin v. Commissioner,
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the mere passage of time but require some event to create the right to income.
For example, dividends are not created until the corporation decides to issue
them." Thus, if a shareholder donates stock after a dividend has been de-
clared and after the record date, the shareholder is taxed on the dividend be-
cause it was already earned at the time of the gift."7
4. Assignment of Income for Consideration
The teaching of the Horst doctrine is that a donor remains liable for the tax
on income if he gives away the right to income but retains the income-produc-
ing property. The previous sections have addressed the consequences of an as-
signment in the form of a gift. Where there has been a sale of income, the
seller is not taxed on the income earned by the buyer.88 Instead, he is taxed on
the consideration from the sale. 9 While the proper taxpayer is known, the
issue in these cases is the character of the seller's gain.90 These cases are
closely related to the gifts of income, and therefore, they help explain some of
the gift assignments.
161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947) (holding that donor is taxable on interest accrued before transfer);
Anthony's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946) (holding donor liable on gift of
interest in oil and gas lease and income therefrom); Rev. Rul. 72-312, 1972-1 C.B. 22; Rev. Rul.
69-102, 1969-1 C.B. 32 (holding donor taxable on cash surrender value of annuity contracts trans-
ferred near maturity).
The reasoning of these cases is entirely logical in light of Horst. The donor owned the property
while the interest accrued, and thus, "enjoyed" this income upon the. disposition of the income-
producing property. "Accrued" with respect to interest and rent is synonymous with "earned"
since interest accrues with the mere passage of time.
In Austin, 161 F.2d at 667, the payee of a note gave the note to her children at a time when
approximately $40,000 of interest had accrued. The Tax Court held the donor liable for the inter-
est accrued while in the donor's hands. Id. at 667. According to the court, the income is taxable to
the person who earns it regardless of whether he actually receives it or exercises his power to
procure its payment to another. See Recent Case, supra note 83, at 282.
86. Rev. Rul. 74-562, 1974 C.B. 28.
87. Rev. Rul. 74-502, 1974-2 C.B. 28.
88. Stranahan v. United States, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding father who sold rights
to future dividends to his son in an arm's length transaction taxable on consideration received
from sale but not on future dividend income); Cotlow v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 186 (2d Cir.
1956) (holding taxpayer who sold rights to his insurance renewal commissions taxable on consid-
eration received from sale but not on future income); see Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 389
n.373.
89. See supra note 88.
90. A gain can have two different characters: capital gain or ordinary income. A capital gain
(or loss) arises on the sale or exchange of "capital assets," which generally includes all property
held by the taxpayer except certain business assets. See 1.R.C. § 1221 (1988). All other gains
(such as salary, rent, interest, and dividends) are considered ordinary income.
As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, capital gains are taxed at the same rate as ordinary
income. However, the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income remains important
because the deduction of capital losses is severely limited and because many Code provisions con-
tinue to rely on the distinction. In addition, the 1990 amendments to the tax laws revive, to some
extent, the capital gains preference. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §
1101, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 1388.
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In the gratuitous assignment of income cases, a critical inquiry is whether
the donor gives away property, which shifts the tax to the donee, or income,
which does not shift the tax to the donee. When a particular interest is sold,
the same distinction is also crucial. However, when applied to a sale, the as-
signment of income doctrine determines not who pays the tax but whether the
gain on the sale is to be treated as a capital gain or ordinary income.91 If the
interest is a property interest, then the gain from the sale qualifies for capital
gains treatment. 2 If the interest is an income interest, which is not a capital
asset,98 then the income is treated as ordinary income.
The assignment of income doctrine was applied to the assignment for con-
sideration area in Commissioner v. P.G. Lake.9 The taxpayer in P.G. Lake
sold a carved-out interest" in the future income of oil and gas property to a
third party. The Supreme Court relied on assignment of income cases9 and
denied capital gains treatment on the grounds that the payment was a substi-
tute for ordinary income.9' The Court considered the interest sold as an in-
come interest rather than a property interest.98 Therefore, the Court held the
taxpayer made an anticipatory assignment of ordinary income.9
91. Del Cotto, supra note 19, at 10; Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 304; Shores, supra note
34, at 464.
92. I.R.C. § 1221 (1988).
93. Id. Only property can be a capital asset.
94. 356 U.S. 260 (1958). The assignment of income doctrine was first applied to the assign-
ment for consideration area in Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). In Hort, a lessee made
a lump-sum payment to a lessor to cancel the lease. The Supreme Court analogized the lump sum
payment to the interest coupon in Horst. The Court held that the lump sum should be treated as
ordinary income, rather than a capital gain, because the payment was a substitute for future rent.
Id. at 31. See Del Cotto, supra note 19, at 10. The author contends that the Court's rationale,
substituting the lump sum for future ordinary income, proves too much. Under the Court's view,
the sale of any property would result in ordinary income because the value of all property gener-
ally is composed of the ordinary income it will produce in the future. Id.
95. A carved out interest, or "horizontal slice," is an undivided interest in the future income
from property for a set number of years, as opposed to a vertical slice, which is a partial interest
for the entire life of the property. See supra note 71.
96. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. at 267 (relying on Lucas and Horst).
97. Id. at 265.
98. Id.; see Del Cotto, supra note 19, at 18. Since the Court considered the interest in P.G.
Lake an income interest rather than a property interest, the gratuitous assignment of income
doctrine and the assignment of income for consideration area are now both analyzed in the same
manner. In both areas, a "vertical slice" (interest coextensive in time with transferor's interest) is
considered property and a "horizontal slice" or "carved out interest" (interest less in time than the
transferor's interest) is considered income. D. PosIN, supra note 16, § 5.03. The assignment of the
"vertical slice" shifts the taxpayer; the assignment of the "horizontal slice" does not. Del Cotto,
supra note 19, at 18.
99. Id. at 267. P.G. Lake was an extension of Hort because the buyer in P.G. Lake was a third
party instead of the party who would otherwise have made the future payments. Lyon & Eustice,
supra note 13, at 304. Since the sale was to a third-party buyer, the interest continued in exis-
tence in the hands of the buyer after the transaction. Thus, the interest more closely resembled
property than income. In contrast, the lease in Hort was extinguished by the lump-sum payment,
thus the interest more closely resembled an advanced payment of income. D. POSIN, supra note 16,
§ 5.03.
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P.G. Lake applied the assignment of income doctrine to the sale of property.
However, different tax consequences arise between sales and gifts.100 For ex-
ample, if a father gave his son the right to receive future dividends from stock
owned by the father, the father would remain liable for the tax on the divi-
dend income later earned. 10 1 However, if the father sold the right to future
dividends to his son in an arm's length transaction, then the father is taxable
only on the consideration received from the sale but not the dividends.1"2 The
son/buyer is taxed on the future dividends.108 Similarly, the gift of previously
earned insurance commissions will not shift the tax liability to the donee,'"
but the sale of previously earned insurance commissions will shift the tax bur-
den to the buyer. 105
To summarize the basic principles of the assignment of income doctrine, one
must start with the proposition that income is taxed to the one who earns it.'"
In the case of income from services, the earner is easily identified as the per-
son who actually performed the services creating the right to compensation.1 0 7
In effect, a taxpayer cannot shift the tax liability on the income that he gener-
ated from his own services.108 However, determining who "earned" the income
100. Ruden, supra note 21, at 74; Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) J-8213; Fed.
Tax Serv. (MB) § A:4.103[3].
101. Hyman v. Nunan, 143 F.2d 425 (2d. Cir. 1944) (holding the donor taxable on the divi-
dends where donor assigned right to future dividends without transferring the stock); see supra
note 64.
102. Stranahan v. United States, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding a father who sold
rights to future dividends to his son in an arm's length transaction taxable on consideration re-
ceived from sale but not on future dividend income); see Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 389
n.373.
103. Ruden, supra note 21, at 74; Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) § A:4.103[3].
104. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940) (holding donor taxable on insurance commis-
sions gratuitously transferred).
105. Cotlow v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding taxpayer who sold rights
to his insurance renewal commissions taxable on consideration received from sale, but not on
future income); see Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 389 n.373.
106. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
107. Eubank, 311 U.S. at 124-25; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); see supra notes 29-45
and accompanying text.
108. aLucas, 281 U.S. at 115. Of course, if the earner performed the services as an agent,
employee, or fiduciary for someone else, then he is not taxed on the income. Teschner v. Commis-
sioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962); see Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of In-
come-the Ferrer Case, 20 TAx L. REV. 1, 43 (1964); Teschner, New Case Restricts IRS At-
tempt to Extend Anticipatory Assignment of Income Doctrine, 18 J. TAX'N 5 (1963); Fed. Tax.
Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) J-8231. Also, the earner is not taxable on the income from his
services if the earner never had a right to receive the income himself. Teschner v. Commissioner,
38 T.C. 1003 (1962).
In addition, if the taxpayer sold the right to income from his services, then he is not taxed on
the future income. Cotlow v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding a taxpayer who
sold rights to his insurance renewal commissions taxable on consideration received from sale, but
not on future income). See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 389 n.373. However, the proceeds
are taxed as ordinary income. Turner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 33 (1962). Thus, the proceeds
from the sale can be seen as a replacement for the income which is taxed immediately, instead of
when the commissions are received.
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is more difficult when property is involved. Generally, if the donor retains the
income-producing property and assigns the income, the donor is taxed on the
income. 109 Conversely, if the donor transfers the income-producing property
(and does not retain control over the property after the transfer), then the
donee is taxed on the income earned after the transfer.1 10 The donor remains
liable, however, for the tax on income already earned at the time of the trans-
fer."1 ' Finally, in an assignment for consideration, the seller treats a sale of
income as ordinary income and a sale of property as a capital gain, and the
purchaser is taxed on income earned after the sale.
1 1 2
B. Application of the Doctrine
The assignment of income doctrine gave courts a new weapon for preventing
income shifting. Courts have used the doctrine in a variety of areas, including
the assignment of income from liquidations, s mergers,1 ' contingent con-
tracts, 1 5 and contest tickets. 1
1. Liquidations and Mergers
Corporate liquidations provide an interesting analogy to dividends. Gener-
ally, when a corporation adopts a plan of liquidation, it thereafter sells its
assets, pays its creditors, and then distributes a final liquidating dividend to its
shareholders.1 ' A liquidation is similar to the declaration of a dividend; the
liquidating dividend is "declared" at the adoption of the plan of liquidation a
and is payable to shareholders on the corporation's records on a date after the
assets are sold.
If a stockholder gives away his stock before the corporation adopts a plan of
109. Horst, 311 U.S. at 116-17.
110. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 13 (1937).
111. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
112. Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958); see also supra note 94 and accompany-
ing text (discussing tax consequences for sale of property).
113. Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. United States, 592 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1979); Jones v. United
States, 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976); Kinsey v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973);
Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972).
114. Estate of Applestein v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 331 (1983).
115. Storz v. Commissioner, 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978); J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1957); Donner v. Commissioner. 227 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1955).
116. Chelius v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 121 (1958).
117. 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 811 (1990). Before 1986, § 337 allowed the corporation a 12-
month period to wind up its liquidation without recognizing gains. I.R.C. § 337 (1954). Generally,
the corporation did not recognize gain or loss on the sale of its assets if the corporation distributed
all of its assets within the 12-monthperiod. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 substantially modified §
337. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, tit. 6, § 631(a), 100 Stat. 2269. Under
current law, a liquidating corporation generally recognizes gain or loss on the corporate assets. See
I.R.C. § 337 (1988).
118. See Allen v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 340, 347 (1976) (holding that adoption of a plan of
liquidation "amounted to the actual declaration of liquidations dividends").
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liquidation, then he is not taxed on the liquidating dividend.119 Because the
stockholder gives away the stock before the right to income has arisen, he
cannot be said to have earned the income, and thus, he is not taxed on the
liquidating dividend.1 0
The Tax Court and each of the federal appellate courts that have addressed
the issue have held that where a stockholder gratuitously transfers his stock
after the plan of liquidation has been adopted but before the final distribution,
the donor stockholder will be taxed on the liquidation proceeds.1 21
The Eighth Circuit, in Hudspeth v. United States,12a was faced with a case
in which the donor gave away the liquidating dividend of a closely held corpo-
ration after a plan of liquidation was adopted. " The plan of liquidation was
119. Winton v. Kelm, 122 F. Supp. 649 (D. Minn.), appeal dismissed, 216 F.2d 957 (8th Cir.
1954) (holding donor not taxable on the liquidating proceeds after he donated stock shortly before
the shareholders voted to liquidate); Apt v. Birmingham, 89 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Iowa 1950)
(same); Stern v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 521 (1950) (same); FED, TAX. COORDINATOR 2d (Res.
Inst. Am.) I J-8228.
120. Note, Jones v. United States: Tax Treatment of Gifts of Stock In a Liquidating Corpora-
tion, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 682, 694 (1977) ("[L]iquidation proceeds are, in effect, 'earned' at the
time the shareholders of a corporation vote to liquidate.").
121. Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. United States, 592 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1979); Kinsey v. Commis-
sioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1978); Jones v. United States, 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976);
Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972); Allen v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 340
(1976); Cook v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 908 (1945).
Although the Fifth Circuit has never addressed precisely the same issue, the court held, under
different facts, that the donee was taxable on the assignment of stock after the corporation
adopted a plan of liquidation. Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971). In Rush-
ing, all of the stockholders sold their shares to an independent trustee after the corporation
adopted a plan of liquidation. Since the trustee owned all of the stock, it maintained the power to
revoke the liquidation proceedings. Id. at 594. Because the transfer was a sale and not a gift, the
issue before the court was when the income from the sale of the stock should be included in the
seller's income, not who should pay the tax. See Allen, 66 T.C. at 348 (1976); Kovey, Changing
Shareholders In Contemplation of a Liquidation: The Planning Involved, 47 J. TAX'N 82, 86 n. 17
(1977). The court ruled that at the time of the sale, the stockholders had no absolute right to the
liquidating dividend. Rushing, 441 F.2d at 598. Since the shareholders did not have an absolute
right to the dividend at the time of the sale, the dividend did not accrue until the distribution date.
Thus, the donor was not taxable on the liquidating dividend. Id. at 598.
Rushing was decided in 1971, before Hudspeth, Kinsey, and Jones. The court in Rushing relied
on Jacobs v. United States, 390 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1968), an earlier Sixth Circuit case. The
Jacobs court held that since the shareholders could revoke the plan of liquidation, the donor was
not taxable on the liquidating dividend because the shareholder's right was not absolute until the
distribution date. Id. at 877. The Sixth Circuit subsequently overruled Jacobs in Jones v. United
States, 531 F.2d 1243 (6th Cir. 1976), and followed Hudspeth and Kinsey.
Rushing is distinguishable from Hudspeth, Kinsey, and Jones in that Rushing involved a sale
rather than a gift, and therefore, the court was not deciding who should be held accountable for
the tax. Also, the donee in Rushing maintained sole power to revoke the liquidation proceeding.
Thus, there was less certainty than in the later liquidation cases. The level of certainty is a key
element in determining whether income is taxed to the donor. Compare Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940) (holding donor taxable where income was certain to be realized) with Teschner v.
Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962) (holding donor not taxable where income was uncertain).
122. 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972).
123. Id. at 276. The plan of liquidation was entered into on April 10, 1964. The donor trans-
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theoretically revocable by the shareholders at the time of the gift.""' Thus, the
stockholders did not have an absolute right to the dividend at the time of the
gift.125 However, since the donor retained sufficient stock to maintain control
over the corporation, he could ensure that the revocation would never occur. "
Despite the fact that the donor shareholder was not "absolutely and indefeasi-
bly entitled in the immediate future to the liquidating distributions on the
stock donated,' ' 2 7 the court held that the donor was liable for the tax on the
liquidating dividend.12 8 The court looked at the "realities and substance" of
the transaction rather than the formalities and remote hypothetical possibili-
ties. 29 The "realities and substance" of the events were that the donor
donated proceeds from the liquidation to the donee, and thus, the donor was
taxed on the proceeds.'80
The Second Circuit, in Kinsey v. Commissioner,"' followed the reasoning of
the Eighth Circuit.8 2 After the corporation adopted a plan of liquidation, the
donor transferred shares representing 56.8% of the corporation to the do-
nee.' 83 Theoretically, the plan of liquidation was revocable by the sharehold-
ers.' 8 ' However, under state law,3 5 a two-thirds vote by the shareholders was
required to rescind the liquidation.'3 6 Adopting the "realities and substance"
approach of the Eighth Circuit, the court held that the donor was taxable on
ferred the shares on January 21, 1965. The corporation distributed the liquidating dividend on
Februaiy 10, 1965. Id. The right to the liquidation proceeds accrued on March 12, 1965, the date
the corporation's board of directors passed the final resolution of dissolution. Id. at 280.
124. Id. at 277. The corporation could revoke the liquidation by majority vote up until March
12, 1965, the date the corporation filed the Articles of Dissolution. Id.
125. The district court viewed this fact as determinative under the authority of Jacobs v.
United States, 390 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1968), which was subsequently overruled by Jones v.
United States, 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of Jacobs. see supra note 121 and
infra note 140. Hudspeth v. United States 335 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (E.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd, 471
F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972).
126. Hudspeth, 471 F.2d at 279.
127. Id. at 277 (quoting Hudspeth, 355 F. Supp. at 1404).
128. Id. at 280.
129. Id. at 277.
130. Id. at 280. Essentially, the court held that the donor gave away income instead of prop-
erty. In substance, "the shares transferred were merely empty vessels by which the taxpayer con-
veyed the liquidation proceeds." Id. at 279. Thus, the shareholders "made contributions not of
stock, but of the proceeds of the liquidation." Id. at 280.
131. 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973). For a discussion of Kinsey, see Note, Taxation of Gifts of
Stock in a Liquidating Corporation: Kinsey.v. Commissioner, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 309 (1974).
132. Kinsey, 477 F.2d at 1061. The donor argued that he was not liable for the liquidating
proceeds because the gift was made before the corporation passed the final resolution of dissolu-
tion--the time at which the liquidation is no longer revocable, and therefore, the time the proceeds
accrued. Id. at 1063.
133. Id. at 1059-60.
134. Thus, the stockholders did not have an absolute right in the dividend at the time of the
gift.
135. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-376(c), 329(d) (West 1987).
136. Kinsey, 477 F.2d at 1060.
1991] CARUTH CORP. v. UNITED STATES 865
the liquidation proceeds. 18 7 In substance, the donee could not revoke the liqui-
dation by itself, and the other stockholders would not revoke the liquidation
because adverse tax consequences would result."38 Since the liquidation was
practically certain to occur, the court refused to consider the remote, theoreti-
cal possibility of rescission of the liquidation. " 9
In Jones v. United States,' " the Sixth Circuit expanded the rulings of the
Eighth and Second Circuits. " A noncontrolling donor of a publicly held cor-
poration transferred shares after a plan of liquidation was adopted. 42 Despite
the donor's lack of control over the corporation,' " the court held that the do-
nor anticipatorily assigned the liquidation proceeds, and therefore, was liable
for the tax.144 The court adopted the "realities and substance" test of the
Eighth and Second Circuits and concluded that the liquidation was practically
certain to occur. "1 5 The mere possibility of rescission was not enough.14 6
137. Id. at 1063 (quoting Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275, 277 (8th Cir. 1972)).
138. Id. The other stockholders would not revoke the liquidation because a revocation would
have caused their distribution to be treated as ordinary income rather than a more favorable
capital gain. Id.
139. Id.
140. 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976). The decision in Jones overruled the Sixth Circuit's earlier
decision in Jacobs v. United States, 390 F.2d 877 (6th Cir 1968), affg per curiam 280 F. Supp.
437 (S.D. Ohio 1966). In Jacobs, the donor donated stock to a charity after the corporation
adopted a plan of liquidation. 280 F. Supp. at 438. Since the liquidation plan could theoretically
be revoked by the shareholders, the donor did not have an absolute right to the dividend at the
time of the gift. Thus, the court held that the donor was not taxable on the liquidating dividend.
Id. at 439; accord Dayton Hydraulic v. United States, 592 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1979). In Dayton. a
subsidiary corporation adopted a plan of liquidation. The parent corporation redeemed the stock
of one of its own shareholders with the stock of the liquidating subsidiary. Id. at 938. The Sixth
Circuit followed its decision in Jones and held the parent corporation taxable on the liquidation
proceeds. Id. at 939. For a discussion of the Jones case, see Note, supra note 120, at 682 (urging
a per se rule that the donor is always taxable on liquidating proceeds from stock donated after the
adoption date regardless of how much control he had owned before or after the gift).
141. In contrast to Hudspeth and Kinsey, the donor in Jones did not have control of the corpo-
ration, owning only 10% of the voting stock. Jones, 531 F.2d at 1344. The decision also was an
expansion of Hudspeth and Kinsey in that those cases dealt with closely held corporations. In
Jones the corporation was publicly held.
142. Id. at 1343.
143. Id. at 1346. The court regarded control as only one factor in determining whether the
liquidation was practically certain to occur. Id. Other factors indicated that the liquidation was
practically certain to occur notwithstanding the absence of control: (1) the taxpayer expected the
liquidation to be completed, (2) the other shareholders would most likely not revoke the liquida-
tion because they would lose the tax advantages of § 337, and (3) the shareholders voted to adopt
the plan by an overwhelming majority (968,605 to 175). Id. at 1345.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1346. In Allen v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 340 (1976), the Tax Court also adopted
the "realities and substance" test. In Allen, the shareholders were doctors who donated 75 % of
their stock to a charity after the corporation adopted a plan of liquidation. Id. at 341, 343, 345.
Since the charity now owned 75% of the stock, it had the voting power to rescind the plan of
liquidation. Id. at 345. The doctors, relying on Jacobs, argued that since the plan was rescindable,
they should not be taxed because they did not have an absolute right to the liquidating dividend.
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The analysis developed by the courts in the liquidation cases has also been
applied in the merger context. In Estate of Applestein v. Commissioner,147 a
father donated stock 48 to his children after the shareholders approved a
merger agreement but before the effective date of the merger."' The court
held that the donor was taxable on the merger proceeds because the merger
was practically certain to occur.160 Since the right to the income had suffi-
ciently matured, or "virtually ripened,"16' at the time of the gift, the donor
was taxed on the merger proceeds notwithstanding that, in form, he trans-
ferred the income-producing property. In substance, the stock was "nothing
more than a vehicle" for the right to receive income from the merger.' 12 "The
stocks transferred were thus hollow receptacles by which the petitioner con-
veyed the merger proceeds to his children. All the children had to do was to
allow the stock to sit in their custodial accounts for a day or two and then hold
out their caps to receive the proceeds."1 5
2. Contingent Contracts
The contingent contract cases follow the reasoning of the liquidation and
merger cases that a donor is taxable on income even though the income was
not fixed and absolute at the time of the gift. The contingent contracts in these
cases are contracts that have been substantially or completely performed, but
are contingent and/or uncertain in the amount of income to be received.1"'
Despite the fact that the right to the income is not fixed and absolute, the
donor is taxable on contingent contracts assigned to the donee.156
Many times the contingent contract issue arises upon the liquidation of a
corporation. In J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner," an accrual basis 5 corpora-
Id. Despite this fact, the Tax Court, using the "realities and substance" test, determined that the
right to receive the liquidating dividend had so matured and ripened at the time of the gift that
the donors could not avoid the tax on the liquidating dividend. Id. at 346. The liquidating pro-
ceeds had ripened because no further action was required by the corporation or shareholders to
complete the distribution of the proceeds. Id. at 347. The Tax Court stated that "[t]he liquidation
... proceeded too far down the road to enable petitioners to escape taxation on the gain attribut-
able to the donated shares." Id. at 348. Thus, the court held the donor taxable. Id.
Interestingly, the Tax Court compared Jones, Kinsey, and Hudspeth with Estate of Smith v.
Commissioner, 292 F.2d 478 (3d. Cir. 1961), where the court held the donor taxable on dividends
from stock transferred after the declaration date but before the record date. Allen, 66 T.C. at 347.
147. 80 T.C. 331 (1983).
148. Actually, the father made a bargain sale to his children. The bargain portion of the sale is
considered a gift. Id. at 336.
149. Id. at 345.
150. Id. at 346.
151. The Tax Court explained that "the timing of the transfer makes it clear that petitioner's
right to the merger proceeds had virtually ripened prior to the transfer." Id.
152. Id. at 345.
153. Id.
154. E.g., Storz v. Commissioner, 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978).
155. Id.; J. Ungar Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1957).
156. 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1957). The corporation was an agent for a Spanish olive exporter
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tion distributed to its sole stockholder at liquidation the right to collect future
commissions.18 Since the amount of the commissions could not be determined
at the time of the distribution, they had not yet accrued, 59 and thus, were not
included in the corporation's income. The Second Circuit, in an opinion writ-
ten by Judge Learned Hand, held that although the income had not yet ac-
crued under accounting principles, the income was earned by the corporation
because it performed all of the services required to create the right to in-
come. 00 Thus, the corporation was held taxable on the income.' 6'
"Earned" has a special meaning in the assignment of income area. The
word in this context is broader than the dictionary definition. 6 ' Instead, in-
come is "earned" if its realization "has become sufficiently proximate in time,
or in likelihood, that the donor of the right to receive it cannot escape taxa-
tion. 1 68 This definition is important because the taxpayer who controls the
source of the income at the time the income is earned is taxable on that
income.
The Eighth Circuit further explained the rationale for taxing the transferor
corporation on contingent contracts in Storz v. Commissioner."" The court
and received commissions based on a percentage of sales. Id. at 91. The corporation was not
entitled to receive its commissions until the goods were shipped. Id.
157. Under the accrual basis of tax accounting, an item of income accrues when all events
necessary to entitle the taxpayer to a fixed and determined right to the income have occurred.
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957). However, all events cannot occur before economic perform-
ance occurs. I.R.C. § 461(h) (1988).
158. J. Ungar, 244 F.2d at 92. The shareholder also received cash, commission receivables, and
chattels. Id.
159. An item of income does not accrue until it is fixed and determined.
160. J. Ungar, 244 F.2d at 93. One commentator has noted:
The element of contingency or uncertainty does bear on the proper time for reporting
income as a matter of tax accounting, but such fact should not be allowed to obscure
or control the fundamentally different question of whom is the proper person to pay
the tax on such income when it does eventually become reportable.
Eustice, supra note 108, at 43.
161. Likewise, the corporation was taxed on substantially performed contingent contracts dis-
tributed in liquidation in Donner v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1955). The corporation
constructed numerous homes on parcels of land it owned and contracted to sell most of the homes.
At that point, the corporation distributed in liquidation all of its property to its stockholders. The
stockholders then officially closed title on the homes and collected the proceeds. Id. at 382. The
court held the corporation taxable on the income from all of the sales because, although not
certain and absolute, the right to income was relatively well determined at the time of the distri-
bution. Id.
162. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 456 (5th ed. 1979) (stating that earn means "to acquire
by labor, service, or performance").
163. Note, supra note 120, at 694 n.64; see also Recent Decision, Taxpayer Who Generates
Income and Designates Its Recipient Held Not Taxable Thereon When He Has No Right to
Receive It, 24 MONT. L..REv. 183, 184 (1963) (stating that earn "in its broadest sense means to
generate or produce income").
164. 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978). In that case, a liquidating corporation assigned substan-
tially completed underwriting contracts to a buyer. Id. at 973. Since the corporation was on the
accrual basis, the income from the contracts was not recognized until all contingencies were satis-
fied and the contract was complete. Id. Furthermore, the corporation did not have a right to
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recognized that income could be earned despite the fact that it had not yet
accrued. It stressed the distinction between the two concepts. The concept of
"earn" is relevant to the question of who is the proper taxpayer. 68 The con-
cept of "accrue," on the other hand, is relevant to the question of when income
becomes taxable. 166 The court concluded that it is "entirely possible that in-
come may have been earned, but not yet realized because not yet accrued.'
'1 7
Thus, the court provided a rationale for taxing contingent contracts to the
transferor based on who earned the income, regardless of whether the income
has accrued.1 68
However, some courts determine whether income is "earned" by the level of
certainty that exists in its collection. For example, in Cold Metal Process Co.
v. Commissioner,169 the corporation distributed the rights to several settled
lawsuits to its sole shareholder. The collection of the lawsuits was contingent
on actions of the government in releasing the damage award to the corpora-
tion."' Several years later, the government relented and the funds were re-
leased, thereby satisfying the contingency.171 The court recognized that al-
though not yet accrued, income could be earned at the time of a transfer.172
However, in the case before it, the court ruled that the income was not
"earned" at the time of distribution because it was too uncertain.178
In sum, the contingent contracts cases demonstrate that income may be con-
sidered "earned" before it has accrued. Although an item of income might not
be fixed and determined, and therefore not accrued, the income could very
payment until the contracts were complete. Id. The selling price of the contracts included the
value of the contracts that the buyer was about to receive. Id. The court held that the income
from the contracts was taxable as corporate income. Id. at 977.
165. Id. at 975. The court stated that the corporation "cannot avoid taxation by assigning the
fruit of its efforts to another, when the fruit however green, has a market value at the time of
assignment. The assignment of income doctrine causes income to be taxed to him who earns it."
Id.
166. Id. As the court stated, "income is taxable only when it has been realized under an accept-
able accounting method. The accrual method of accounting generally provides that realization
occurs when the taxpayer has fixed right to a reasonably ascertainable sum." Id. (citing Treas.
Reg. § 1446-1(c)(ii)).
167. Id. at 976.
168. See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 13, at 389. This reasoning applies to the transfer of
contingent contracts outside of liquidation. Eubank v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); 34 AM.
JUR. 2D Federal Taxation 5396 (1985); Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) J-8230;
Fed. Tax Serv..(MB) § A:4.106. For example, in Eubank v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 122 (1940),
an insurance agent assigned renewal commissions that were contingent and uncertain in amount.
The Supreme Court held that the donor was liable for the tax when the donee received the in-
come. Id. at 127.
169. 247 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957).
170. Id. at 872. At the time of the distribution, the government was contesting the corpora-
tion's legal right to the money. Due to this uncertainty, the money had not yet accrued, nor had it
been earned. Id.
171. Id. at 868-71.
172. Id. at 872.
173. Id.
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well be considered earned. In such a case, the income would be taxed to the
corporation. The contingent contract cases also introduce the level of certainty
as a factor in determining whether income is earned. Although, theoretically,
the level of certainty should not affect the determination of whether income is
earned,"" some courts do not consider income that is relatively uncertain to be
earned. This uncertainty factor is also applicable to the contest ticket cases.
3. Contest Tickets
Another type of assignment of uncertain income is the assignment of a con-
test ticket such as a lottery ticket, racing ticket, or writing contest entry. The
issue in this area is who should pay the tax on the income from a winning
ticket where the buyer of the ticket donates the right to the income before the
drawing. 17 5 The assignment of a contest ticket presents an interesting test for
the assignment of income doctrine because although the donor created the
right to the income, the right to the income is very uncertain at the time of the
assignment. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") took the position that the
donor should be liable for the tax because it was his personal effort that cre-
ated the right to the income.17 The Tax Court, however, held that the donee
is taxable because the right to income is too uncertain at the time of the
gift.1'7 Thus, even though, in theory, the level of uncertainty should not affect
174. See supra note 160.
175. If a taxpayer assigns the contest ticket after the drawing, then the donor is responsible for
the tax. Braunstein v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1132 (1962). This is logical in light of
Horst because the donor had a certain, ascertainable right to income at the time of the
assignment.
176. Rev. Rul. 58-127, 1958-1 C.B. 42. This revenue ruling dealt with a taxpayer who entered
a contest, designating that should he win, the prize would go to his daughter. When the taxpayer's
entry was selected as the winning entry, the sponsor of the contest sent the taxpayer a check
payable to his child, and made no restrictions on the use of the funds. The IRS ruled that the
taxpayer was taxable on the prize because his personal efforts created the right to receive the
income. The taxpayer's anticipatory arrangement to vest income to the child did not relieve him of
the tax. Id. at 43; see also Rev. Rul. 58-235, 1958-1 C.B. 26. The donor agreed to participate in a
quiz show provided that any prize he won would be paid directly to a tax-exempt organization in
which the donor was a director. The donor won a prize, which was paid to the tax-exempt organi-
zation. The IRS ruled that the donor was taxable on the income because he created the right to
receive income through his personal efforts. Id. at 27-28.
177. Chelius v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 121 (1958). In Chelius, the donor orally
assigned, to a family member, his right to receive the income from a sweepstakes ticket before the
drawing. The Tax Court held that the donee was taxable because the right to income was too
uncertain. Id. at 125.
If the donor assigns the right to the income after the ticket is determined to be the winning
ticket, then the income is no longer uncertain and is taxable to the donor. Braunstein, 21 T.C.M.
at 1132. In Braunstein, there were two levels of prizes. First, several tickets were selected as
preliminary winners and assigned to a horse in a race. Id. Second, the ticket representing the
winning horse won the grand prize. The donor in the case assigned his ticket after he won the
preliminary prize but before the final race. The court held the donor was taxable on the prelimi-
nary prize. Id. at 1134-35. The court reasoned that the taxpayer assigned the ticket after his
ticket had been selected as a winner, and therefore, had a right to collect the preliminary prize.
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the time at which income is earned, the donee of a contest ticket is taxable.
The contest ticket cases represent the opposite end of the spectrum from
Horst. In Horst, realization of the interest income was guaranteed because
interest is earned with the mere passage of time. Thus, in Horst, the court
held the donor was taxable because he donated income that was certain to
accrue. 178 In the contest ticket cases, however, the right to receive the income
was very uncertain. Thus, courts have held that the donor was not taxable. 17'
Id. at 1135.
In Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962), the Tax Court ruled that the donee should
be liable for the tax on the assignment of an entry to an essay contest. The donor was precluded,
however, from ever receiving the prize. Id. at 1006. Thus, the Tax Court was faced with a situa-
tion where the donor created the right to income through his personal efforts but could never
receive the income himself. The IRS argued that the donor should be taxed because his efforts
created the right to receive the income, notwithstanding that he could never receive it himself. Id.
It reasoned that since the donor had the power to dispose of the income, which under Horst is
equivalent to realization, the donor should be taxed on the income. Id. at 1007.
The Tax Court rejected the argument and held that the donor was not taxable on the income.
Id. The Tax Court conceded that the power to dispose of income is tantamount to realization
under the Horst doctrine. However, the court ruled that in the case before it, the donor did not
have the "power to dispose" because the power to dispose presupposes that the donor had a right
to possession. Id. at 1007. The strong implication from the Teschner case is that a taxpayer could
not be taxed on income unless he had a right to receive it at some point in time. See Recent
Decision, supra note 163, at 183.
Commentators are also split on the issue. Eustice believes that the donor should have been taxed
since his efforts created the right to the income and the corresponding power to dispose of it. He
analogized the lottery ticket to a trust in which the grantor retains the power to designate the
recipient of the income from the trust. Such income from a trust is taxed to the grantor. Likewise,
Eustice concludes, the donor of the lottery ticket who had the power to designate the recipient of
the income should be taxed. In both situations, the person who "earned" the income should pay
the tax on it. Eustice. supra note 108, at 44; see also Note, Prize Payable to Taxpayer's Daugh-
ter and Produced by His Efforts Taxed to Daughter, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 663 (1963). The author of
the Note from the Illinios Law Forum concluded that the donor should be taxable for the same
reasons as Eustice. The author expressed concern over the tax abuse possibilities that would be
available after Teschner. He hypothesized that an employer could set up a salary structure where
an employee received only part of his normal salary. An additional amount would be paid to a
person designated by the employee, provided that this amount could never be paid to the em-
ployee. Under the rule of Teschner. the employee, who performed the services to create the right
to income, would be able to assign the income because he never had a right to receive it. Id. at
666-67.
On the other hand, other commentators have concluded that the taxpayer could not be taxed on
income unless he had a right to receive the income himself at some time. Teschner, supra note 17,
at 596; see also Recent Decision, supra at 30; Note, Federal Taxation Contestant Not Taxable
on Prize When Contest Rules Required Assignment, 48 MINN. L. REV. 815, 820 (1964) [hereinaf-
ter Note, Contestant Not Taxable].
The author of that Note expressed the same concern of tax avoidance possibilities as the author
from the Illinois Law Forum. To mitigate this problem, the author suggested that the Teschner
rule should only apply where a third party, instead of the donee, prevents the donor from receiving
the prize. Id. at 821.
178. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
179. Generally, the donor is not taxable on income if it was uncertain at the time of the gift.
See Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that a donor who assigned the
rights in a lawsuit before the case was adjudicated was not taxable on the judgement award
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Between these two polar opposites lie the cases of assignments of liquidation
proceeds and assignments of stock after the declaration of a dividend and
before the record date. The next section discusses the latter type of
assignment.
C. Assignment of Stock After Declaration Date
According to the traditional assignment of income doctrine, an assignment
of property, such as stock, will shift the tax burden to the donee. 8 0 However,
income already earned at the time of the transfer, even if contingent or not
absolutely certain to arise, is taxed to the donor.18" ' Thus, where stock is trans-
ferred before a dividend is declared, the donor does not pay the tax on a subse-
quent dividend.18 2 Before declaration, the shareholders have no right to a divi-
dend. "'83 However, where a donor transfers stock after a dividend has been
declared, an issue arises as to whether the dividend has been "earned," in
which case the dividend would be taxable to the donor.1
8 4
Before corporations started to use a record date, the assignment of stock
"with dividend" was treated no differently than any other property'85 in which
payment occurred after the right to the payment was fixed and determined.
186
because it was too uncertain at the time of the gift); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner,'
247 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957) (discussed supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text); Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 585 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (holding donor not
taxable due to uncertainty of income where donor donated the rights to all future payments on
Mixed Claims Commission awards which were paid by Germany to the Commission to compen-
sate for property confiscated during World War I); Dodge v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 535 (D.
Or. 1977) (holding donor who assigned to his daughter the right to receive one half of his
brother's estate was not taxable on income. from the estate because the donor's claim was too
uncertain); Fed. Tax. Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) J-8202; Fed. Tax Serv. (MB) § A:4.107.
180. See supra note 73.
181. See supra note 80.
182. E.g., Marshall v. Commissioner, 57 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1932). Prior to the declaration of a
dividend, this situation is analagous to the transfer of income-producing property.
183. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); 7 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
WITH TAX PLANNING § 141.04[3], at 141-52 (rev. perm. ed. 1989); 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corpora-
tions § 1204 (1985). The decision of whether to declare a dividend is at the discretion of the
corporation's board of directors. Shareholders have no legal right to net profits or accumulated
earnings until a dividend is declared.
184. The donor remains taxable for any previously earned income even if he transfers the in-
come-producing property itself. E.g., Estate of Holmes v. Commissioner, I T.C. 508, 511-12
(1943) (ruling that the Horst doctrine applies even if the income-producing property is transferred
because the income is already realized; donor essentially is transferring a "tree" with ripe "fruit").
Thus, in Caruth, if the dividend is considered "earned" on the declaration date, then the donor is
taxed on it even if he transfers the stock itself.
185. Many other types of property produce income that is payable after it is earned. For exam-
ple, the interest on a bond is earned daily but is not payable until a future date. E.g., Helvering v.
Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). A court judgement is earned when the judgement occurs but is
payable at a future date. E.g., Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945). In all of
these situations, the donor cannot avoid paying tax on the imminent payment by assigning the
property before payment.
186. Rev. Rul. 74-562, 1974 C.B. 28.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:845
Where no record date exists, the declaration date controls over the actual pay-
ment date with regard to when the income is earned.'87 The declaration of a
dividend creates a debtor/creditor relationship between the corporation and its
stockholders.188 Therefore, after the declaration date, the corporation could
not revoke the dividend.189 The declaration of the dividend created the right to
receive the dividend, which thereafter was separate from the stock.190 Thus,
the stockholder holding the stock on the declaration date, as opposed to the
payment date, was taxed on the dividend. 191 The theory was that on the decla-
ration date the corporation set aside assets to pay for the dividend by recogniz-
ing the liability on its accounting records. Furthermore, once established, the
debt continued in existence regardless of any future actions by the corpora-
tion. "' Thus, by declaring a dividend, the corporation created a liability owed
to the shareholders and severed an interest in the "earnings and profits" of the
corporation. 9 As a result, the stockholder had a fixed and absolute right to
the dividend. 19 " Under the assignment of income doctrine, if the stockholder
187. Estate of Crellin v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 781 (1951), affid sub. nom. Crellin's Estate v.
Commissioner, 203 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1953). In Estate of Crellin, the corporation declared a
dividend with no record date. The court held that the dividend vested on the declaration date. Id.
at 782; see also 7 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 183, § 141.04[3] (same); Note, supra note 25, at 437-
38 (same).
Both parties in Caruth agreed that in the absence of a record date, the right to the dividend is
created on the declaration date. Reply Brief for the Appellant at 6, Caruth v. United States, 865
F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-1015).
188. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123, 126 (1919); Kraft
Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Goldwyn, 175
F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Cohen, 121 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1941); Lamberth v.
Commissioner, 120 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. T.C. Miller Mill Co., 102 F.2d 599
(5th Cir. 1939); United States v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 97 F.2d 413 (9th Cir.
1938); Commissioner v. Scatena, 85 F.2d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 1936); United States v. Guinzburg,
278 F. 363 (2d Cir. 1921); McKelvy v. United States, 478 F.2d 1217, 1234 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (Skel-
ton, J., dissenting); Bulgar Block Coal Co., 48 F.2d 675 (Ct. Cl. 1931); Caleb & Co. v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 615 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Glenn, 36 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Ky. 1941); Rev. Rul. 75-554, 1975-2 C.B. 478; Rev. Rul. 69-130,
1969-1 C.B. 93; 7 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 183 § 141.04[3]; 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5365 (rev. perm. ed. 1986); 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corpora-
tions § 1224 (1985); Note, Rights in Ordinary Corporate Dividends: Significance of Date of
Closing Transfer Books, 38 HARV. L. REV. 245 (1924).
189. Crellin's Estate v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1953); McKelvy v. United
States, 478 F.2d 1217, 1234 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (Skelton, J., dissenting); Caleb & Co. v. E.I. Dupont
de Nemours & Co., 615 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 7 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 183, §
141.04[3]; Note, supra note 188, at 247-49.
190. 11 W. FLETCHER, supra note 188, § 5365; 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1224, at 124
(1985).
191. See supra note 73.
192. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1208 (1985).
193. Note, When Do Dividends Vest?, 27 GEO. L.J. 74 (1938).
194. Wheeler v. Northwestern Sleigh Co., 39 F. Supp. 347, 349 (E.D. Wis. 1889). The
Wheeler court stated:
The earnings represented by the dividend . . . become a debt of the company to the
individual who at the time of the declaration of the dividend was the owner of the
1991] CARUTH CORP. v. UNITED STATES
assigned stock after he already had the right to receive the dividend, he was
taxed on the dividend income. 195 The situation is no different than a donor
who assigns a bond after a coupon has become due but before it is paid, 196 or a
donor who assigns a court judgment after the judgment but before it is paid.'97
The general practice today is for the corporation to establish a record
date.198 The record date was established for the administrative convenience
and protection of the corporation. 99 As long as the corporation paid the owner
registered on its records, the corporation could not be sued for failing to pay
the rightful owner of the dividend. °0  Thus, corporations pay dividends to the
stockholders of record on a date between the declaration date and the payment
-date.2o'
If the donor transfers the stock with dividend after the declaration and rec-
ord date but before payment, then the donor is taxable on the dividend. 02
Because the donor has a right to the dividend, he cannot escape the tax by
assigning the right to receive the dividend before it becomes due.201 Since the
donor donated the stock after both the declaration and record dates he there-
fore had a right to receive the dividend. These cases present no real analytical
problems.2 0 4
stock. That the dividend is payable at a future date can work no distinction in the
right. The debt exists from the time of the declaration of the dividend, although pay-
ment is postponed for the convenience of the company. The right became fixed and
absolute by the declaration. This right could, of course, be transferred with the stock
by special agreement, but not otherwise. The dividend would not pass as an incident
of the stock.
Id. (quoted in 7 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 183, § 141.04[3]). Accord McGlue's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 119 F.2d 167, 171 (4th Cir. 1941). See also 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1224 (1985);
11 W. FLETCHER, supra note 188, § 5377.
195. Rev. Rul. 74-562, 1974-2 C.B. 28 (holding donor taxable on stock transferred after decla-
ration date, which was also record date, but before payment date).
196. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
197. Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945). In Doyle, a taxpayer attempted to
assign a court judgment after an appeal was denied but before it was paid. The court held that the
donor was liable for the tax because he had a vested right to receive the judgement. Id. at 771.
198. E.g., Caleb Co. v. Commissioner, 615 F. Supp. 96 (1985).
199. Id. (citing Note, supra note 25, at 437-39); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Glenn, 36 F.
Supp. 552 (W.D. Ky. 1941); 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1237 (1985); Note, supra note 188,
at 246-47; 7 Z. CAVITCH, SUPRA note 183, § 142.11[2].
200. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1235 (1985).
20 1. Id.
202. Rev. Rul. 74-562, 1974-2 C.B. 28. In Rev. Rul. 74-562, a donor donated stock after the
declaration date, which was also the record date to a charity. The IRS ruled that the donor was
taxable on the dividend under the reasoning of Horst. Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 82-1l, 1982-1 C.B.
51. In Rev. Rul. 82-11, a shareholder bought stock after the record date but before the ex-divi-
dend date. The ex-dividend date is the date under'stock exchange rules at which time the buyer is
no longer entitled to the dividend. Despite the stock exchange rules, the IRS ruled that the seller,
not the buyer, was taxable on the dividend. Id. at 52.
203. This is an application of the Horst doctrine.
204. This rule is not changed by stock exchange rules determining who is entitled to receive the
dividend. Rev. Rul. 82-11, 1982-1 C.B. 51. In Rev. Rul. 82-11, a shareholder sold stock after the
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Similarly, the case of a sale of stock between the declaration and record
dates is well settled. Treasury Regulation 1.61-9(c) provides that the buyer in
this situation is taxable on the dividend rather than the seller.2°0 The rationale
for this rule is logical since the seller realizes the proceeds of the sale at the
time of the sale. This rule prevents the seller from being taxed on both the
dividend and the sale proceeds. The seller pays tax based on the stock pro-
ceeds, which includes the value attributable to the dividend in the year in
which the sale occurred."0 6 Thus, the regulation provides certainty in the com-
plex area of traded securities.20 7
The issue that arose in Caruth Corp. v. United States dealt with a gift of
stock "with dividend" after the declaration date but before the record date.
Originally, dividends were considered accrued and absolute on the declaration
date, even where a record date existed.2 08 Since the declaration of a dividend
creates a debtor/creditor relationship in most states,2"9 the right to receive the
dividend arose on the declaration date. For example, in Helvering v. McGlue's
Estate,21 0 the shareholder died after the declaration date but before the record
record date but before the "ex-dividend" date. Under stock exchange rules, the buyer was entitled
to the dividend if he bought the stock before the ex-dividend date. Usually, the ex-dividend date is
four days before the record date, but if the dividend exceeds fourteen percent of the stock, as was
the case here, postponement is possible. Despite the stock exchange rules to the contrary, the IRS
ruled that the seller was taxable on the dividend. Id. at 52. The private contract between the
parties which stated that the buyer was entitled to receive the dividend was not controlling. See
also Silco v. United States, 779 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1986) (the court stated that it would follow
Rev. Rul. 82-11 in future cases).
Similarly, if the record date is prior to the declaration date, then a right to the dividend is
created on the declaration date. Thus, the holder of the stock on the declaration date is taxable on
the dividend. For example, in Walker v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1976), the corpo-
ration declared a dividend on October 24, 1964, payable to all shareholders of record on Septem-
ber 30, 1964. A shareholder sold his shares after the declaration date. The court held the seller
taxable on the dividend because he held the stock on the declaration date, the date the right to the
dividend was created. Id. at 442. Accord Gilmore v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1321 (1956). The
corporation declared dividend on December 12, 1949 to shareholders of record on November 26,
1949. When a shareholder sold shares after the dividend was declared, the court held that the
seller was taxable on the dividend because he held the stock on the declaration date. Id. at 1325.
205. Treas. Reg. 1.61-9(c) (as amended 1964). This Regulation provides in relevant part that
"[w]hen stock is sold between the time of declaration and the time of payment of the dividend,
and the dividend takes place at such time that the purchaser becomes entitled to the dividend, the
dividend ordinarily is income to him." Id.
206. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 72, 7.07, at 7-46.
207. Id. (stating that "[t]his approach ... seems largely a matter of administrative
convenience").
208. Commissioner v. Cohen, 121 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1941); Lamberth v. Commissioner, 120
F.2d 101, 105 (9th Cir. 1941); Helvering v. McGlue's Estate, 119 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1941); First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Glenn, 36 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Ky. 1941); Ledyard v. Commissioner,
44 B.T.A. 1056 (1941).
209. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. In some states, however, the declaration of the
dividend does not create a corporate liability. Richter & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 A. 600
(1922). In Richter, the court held that the debt arises at the record date. See infra notes 228-30
and accompanying text.
210. 119 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1941)
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date. Section 42 of the Tax Code provided that amounts accrued at the time
of death were included in the decedent's final tax return.2 1' The court held
that stock dividends accrued on the declaration date and thus were includible
in the decedent's final return. 212 The court's decision was based on the fact
that under state law, the declaration of a dividend created a separate, vested
right218 to the dividend in favor of the shareholder.21 This was true despite the
fact that the state statute provided that "only stockholders of record at the
time [of the record date] shall be entitled to receive such dividend. 2 5 The
court read this language to mean only that the purpose of the record date was
to protect the corporation where it paid the dividend to the stockholder regis-
tered on the corporation's books on the record date.21 '6 The court did not read
the statute to mean that the dividend accrued on the record date.
In 1945, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Estate of Putnam v. Com-
missioner1 7 that dividends do not accrue on the declaration date.21 8 The facts
were identical to McGlue's Estate: the shareholder died after the declaration
date but before the record date.21 9 Again section 42 of the Tax Code provided
that amounts accrued at the time of death were included in the decedent's
final tax return.2 20 The Court held that the dividend did not accrue on the
declaration date because the distributee was not fixed and determined. 221 The
Court left open whether the dividend accrued on the record date, payment
date, or the date of receipt by the shareholder.2 2 The Court found that a
211. Id. at 169.
212. Id. at 172.
213. "Vested right" means an absolute, unconditional present right to present or future enjoy-
ment that does not depend on an uncertain event. A person has a vested right if it cannot be
divested from him without his consent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1402 (5th ed. 1979). Nor-
mally, income is earned at the same time the right to income is vested and accrued. In certain
situations, however, such as the assignment in the subject opinion, these three concepts are not
necessarily simultaneous. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957). However, all events cannot occur
before economic performance occurs. I.R.C. § 461(h) (1988).
214. McGlue's Estate, 119 F.2d at 171; accord Commissioner v. Cohen, 121 F.2d 348 (5th Cir.
1941); Lamberth v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 101, 105 (9th Cir. 1941); First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Glenn, 36 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Ky. 1941); Ledyard v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1056
(1941).
215. Helvering v. McGlue's Estate, 119 F.2d 167, 171 (4th Cir. 1941).
216. Id.
217. 324 U.S. 393 (1945).
218. Id. at 398.
219. Id. at 395.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 399-400.
222. Id. at 398. Treasury Regulation 1.301-1(b) subsequently answered the question left open
in Estate of Putnam. The regulation ruled that dividends accrue on the day of actual receipt by
the shareholder. Thus, both cash basis and accrual basis shareholders include the dividend in
income when actually received. See also American Light & Traction Co. v. Commissioner, 156
F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1946); Tar Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1942);
Dynamics Corp. of America v. United States, 392 F.2d 241 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Allied Fidelity Corp.
v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1068 (1976). Technically, the rule for the accrual of dividends does not
comply with the "all events" test of Treasury Regulation 1.451-1(a) used in determining when
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uniform federal rule should determine when income accrues so that accrual
and cash basis taxpayers both include the dividend in income at the same
time.22 The Court acknowledged that the question of when dividends accrue
was a separate question from when dividends vest. 224 Estate of Putnam dealt
with the question of when dividend income should be included in income, but
it did not decide who should pay the tax. 225
As the court in McGlue's Estate indicated, the record date was designed for
the administrative convenience of the corporation. However, at the time of
Estate of Putnam, four states had held that the record date is the date on
which the dividend vests.226 This means that the shareholder actually owning
the stock, not necessarily the shareholder on the corporate books, on the record
date is entitled to receive the dividend.2 27 The Connecticut Supreme Court, in
Richter & Co. v. Light,228 created the so-called "Connecticut Rule." The court
held that the dividend vests on the record date because, under Connecticut
law, that is the date on which a debtor/creditor relationship is created.22 9 The
court stated that the corporation was free to choose the date on which the
corporation's liability should begin.230
The relationship between state and federal tax law was explained in
Aquilino v. United States.2 8' The Supreme Court ruled that state law deter-
mined the nature and extent of the taxpayer's property rights while federal tax
law attached tax consequences to those rights. 23 2 Thus, even though under
state law the assignments in Lucas and Horst were valid and the donees were
entitled to receive the income, the donor was still held taxable under federal
tax laws.2"' As applied to the assignment of stock in cases such as Richter,
state law determines whether the assignment is valid, who is entitled to the
dividend, and when the corporation incurs a liability to the shareholders; fed-
eral tax law determines whether the donor's rights at the time of the gift are
income accrues. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,327 (Nov. 18, 1987). The rule is, therefore, seen as pro-
moting a uniform rule for both cash and accrual method taxpayers.
223. Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 393, 396 n.3 (1945).
224. Id.
225. See Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 478, 480 (3d. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 967 (1962). The court distinguished Estate of Putnam in this manner.
226. Smith v. Taecker, 133 Cal. App. 351, 24 P.2d 182 (1933); Richter & Co. v. Light, 97
Conn. 364, 116 A. 600 (1922); Ford v. Ford Mfg. Co., 22 Ill. App. 76, 84 (1921); Nutter v.
Andrews, 246 Mass. 224, 142 N.E. 67 (1923); see Estate of Putnam, 324 U.S. at 396 n.3.
227. 7 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 183, § 141.0413] (stating that when the "transfer takes place
after the dividend is declared and the purchaser is not registered as the record owner on the record
date, the common law rule is that these dividends belong to the buyer").
228. 97 Conn. 364, 116 A. 600 (1922).
229. Id. at 370-71, 116 A. at 603.
230. Id. at 370, 116 A. at 602-03.
231. 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
232. Id. at 512-13; see also Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 478, 479 (3d. Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962); Rev. Rul. 75-554, 1975-2 C.B. 478.
233. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930).
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sufficient to hold him taxable.134
Several other states have adopted the Connecticut Rule that dividends vest
at the record date." ' Although these states adopted the Richter court's con-
clusion, they failed to consider the underlying rationale of Richter. The courts
in these jurisdictions did not base their decisions on the fact that a debtor/
creditor relationship is created on the record date.2"' Nevertheless, they held
that a dividend vests on the record date, despite the fact that under state law a
debtor/creditor relationship was formed on the declaration date. In these
states, a dividend vests on the record date even though a corporate liability is
created on the declaration date.
17
In sum, the general rule in most states, for both sales and gifts, is that a
corporation avoids liability for the dividend if it pays the shareholder of record
on the record date. 35 However, the actual owner of the stock on the record
date is entitled to receive the dividend, even if he is not registered on the
corporate books.239 As a result, if the transferor is registered on the corpora-
tion's records and the transferee is the actual owner on the record date, then
the transferor must transfer the dividend (which he will receive) to the
transferee.2 40
The only case which has addressed the issue of a gift of stock after the
declaration date but before the record, date is Estate of Smith v. Commis-
sioner.2, In Estate of Smith, a controlling shareholder donated stock to his
234. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 12 (1937); United States v. Shafto, 246 F.2d 338, 343
(1957); Rev. Rul. 75-554, 1975-2 C.B. 478.
235. See Rev. Rul. 75-554, 1975-2 C.B. 478; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7209281850A (Sept. 28, 1972);
Note, supra note 193, at 76 (discussing those states which apply the Connecticut Rule); Note,
supra note 25, at 438 (same).
236. In these states, the debtor/creditor relationship still is created on the declaration date. See
Rev. Rul. 75-554, 1975-2 C.B. 478; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7209281850A (Sept. 28, 1972).
237. See Rev. Rul. 75-554, 1975-2 C.B. 478; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7209281850A (Sept. 28, 1972).
238. 7 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 183, § 141.04[3] ("the corporation has the right to pay the
dividend to the holder of record on the record date"); 11 W. FLETCHER, supra note 188, § 5377
(stating that when a record date is set, "the corporation may safely pay the shareholder of record
on that date").
239. 7 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 183, § 141.04[3] (stating that when the "transfer takes place
after the dividend is declared and the purchaser is not registered as the record owner on the record
date, the common law rule is that these dividends belong to the buyer").
240. Id. § 141.04[3] (stating that "[w]hile the corporation has the right to pay the dividend to
the holder of record on the record date, such holder might be required to pay it over to a trans-
feree" if he is the actual owner on the record date).
241. 292 F.2d 478 (3d. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962). Bishop v. Shaughnessy,
195 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1952), is sometimes cited for the proposition that the donee, rather than the
donor, is taxed on gifts of stock made after the declaration date but before the record date. How-
ever, Bishop is not good authority for this proposition because in that case, the corporation did not
set a record date. The donor donated stock after the corporation passed a resolution authorizing
the treasurer to distribute at his discretion back dividends accumulated on cumulative stock. Sig-
nificantly, the resolution did not fix a record or payment date. The court found that no legally
enforceable right to the dividend arose at the date of the resolution. Id. at 685. Since the resolu-
tion was too indefinite, it was not the equivalent of the declaration of a dividend. Id. Recall that
where no record date exists, the right to the dividend is created on the declaration date rather
1991]
878 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:845
children after the declaration date but one day before the record date. The
court first determined that under New Jersey law a dividend vested as of the
declaration date. The taxpayers argued that this rule was inapplicable where
the corporation establishes a record date. However, the court ruled that the
right to the dividend had sufficiently vested on the declaration date.24 2 In ap-
plying the Horst doctrine, the court concluded that since the donor had a right
to the dividend as of the declaration date, he could not escape the tax by
assigning the dividend, along with the stock, to his children.243 Thus, the court
held that the dividend income was taxable to the donor. The court found Es-
tate of Putnam distinquishable because that case dealt with when income is
accrued for purposes of inclusion in a decedent's tax return, while the case
before it dealt with who earned the income.2 "
/
D. Substance Over Form Doctrine
The IRS has from time to time resorted to the substance over form doc-
trine.24 5 In its general application, this doctrine operates to give effect to the
economic realities of a transaction rather than the form in which it is cast.246
The Supreme Court stated, in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,24 7 that
"[tlo permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formal-
isms, which exists solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the ef-
fective administration of the tax policies of Congress. 24 8
This doctrine has been applied to the assignment of stock in different con-
than the payment date. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
242. Estate of Smith, 292 F.2d at 480. The court stated that "'the fruit had ripened' before
the gift." Id.
243. Id. at 479.
244. Id. at 480. The court explained that Estate of Putnam and its progeny
indicate merely that, even if the parents here had themselves retained the stock and
received the dividends they would properly have accounted for this income in the year
of distribution rather than the year of declaration .... But such determination of
the proper time does not help solve the present problem, whether the donor or donee
of the right to the dividend is the person legally required to pay the tax upon it.
Id.
245. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1960) (holding a transaction was a sham
between taxpayer and insurance company which resulted in impermissible deductions and tax
avoidance); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (holding that a sale by
stockholders of property conveyed in the form of a liquidating dividend was really sale by corpora-
tion); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940) (holding that a taxpayer cannot deduct a loss
from sale of securities made to a corporation wholly owned by taxpayer); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935); Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th
Cir. 1970) (holding that a corporation impermissibly disguised a portion of sale price as an in-
tercompany dividend), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971); see also Rev. Rul. 89-102, 1989-35
1.R.B. 8.
246. The Fifth Circuit in Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d at 1192,
stated that tax consequences must turn upon the economic substance of a transaction and not
upon the form of the transaction.
247. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
248. Id. at 334.
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texts. For example, in Rollins v. United States,249 a shareholder elected to
exercise his option to purchase the shares of the taxpayer. 5 The buying
shareholder deposited five percent of the purchase price in an escrow account
and agreed to pay the balance several months later. After the buyer exercised
his option to buy the shares but before the sale was finally closed, the taxpayer
donated his stock to a charity. 51 Even though'the taxpayer's right to receive
income was contingent on the buyer paying the full purchase price, the court
found that the sale was virtually certain to be closed."' By looking at the
substance of the transaction, the court ruled that the assignment of income
doctrine required the taxpayer to be taxed on the proceeds of the sale.258 The
court concluded that in reality the donor donated income realized from the
sale to the charity.2 54
Similarly, in Overton v. Commissioner,255 the controlling shareholders of a
corporation directed the corporation to reorganize the common stock into two
classes, Class A and Class B.25' The Class B stock had limited voting power
and liquidating value, but had a residual share in any excess dividends that
remained after Class A stock was paid.257 The controlling shareholders
donated the Class B stock to their spouses. 58 The dividend distributed on the
Class B stock was approximately double that paid on the Class A stock for the
year in question.2 " The court ruled that although in form the shareholders
made a gift of stock, in substance they assigned part of their future dividends
to their spouses while retaining effective control over the income-producing
property.260 Thus, the court held the donors liable for the tax burden.2 61
249. 302 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Tex. 1969).
250. Id. at 814. Two groups of shareholders of a closely-held corporation were in dispute. To
resolve the dispute the two groups negotiated a "buy and sell" agreement where the minority
shareholder could elect to either sell all of his shares to the majority group or buy all the shares
from the majority group. Id. The minority shareholder elected to buy all the stock from the major-
ity group.
251. Id. at 815.
252. Id. at 818.
253. Id.
254. Id. Both charities sold the shares they had received to the shareholder who had purchased
the taxpayer's shares.
255. 162 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1947).
256. Id. at 156.
257. Id. Class A stock was to receive a ten dollar per share dividend before any payments were
made to Class B stock. Any excess dividends that remained after the payment to the Class A





261. Id.; see also Babson v. Delany, 51 A.F.T.R. 1346 (D. Mass. 1956). In Babson, a control-
ling shareholder issued a new class of stock to his wife under the color of a sale. The dividends on
the new class by far exceeded those on the other classes. The court held the donor taxable because
the sale in reality was a gift and dividends paid on the new class of stock was in reality an
assignment of income. Id. at 1347-48.
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The common element in all these cases applying the substance over form
doctrine is that a taxpayer who owned the stock when the right to income
arose cannot escape the taxation by a formal arrangement "however skillfully
devised" that attempts to shift the tax to another. The court in Caruth Corp.
v. United States2 2 was asked to decide if the taxpayer's formal arrangement
was in substance an attempt to assign income already earned.
II. CARUTH CORP. V. UNITED STATES
A. Facts
A taxpayer owned a seventy-five percent controlling interest in both the
common voting and nonvoting stock of a Texas corporation.262 He also owned
one hundred percent of the preferred nonvoting stock.2 6 ' The remaining shares
were owned by the taxpayer's two nephews. " The corporation was success-
ful 66 and had accumulated substantial earnings in its twenty-five year history,
during which the corporation never paid out a dividend.2 7 Since the taxpayer
planned to wind down the activities of the corporation, he was seeking to "get
money out of" the corporation.26" The taxpayer also wanted to buy his es-
tranged nephews' shares but they refused, and he hoped to entice them to sell
the stock by declaring a substantial dividend.269 To accomplish these results,
the taxpayer directed the corporation to declare a dividend on May 8, 1978
payable on May 17 to shareholders of record on May 15.270
One day after the declaration date but prior to the record date, the taxpayer
donated 1,000 shares of his preferred nonvoting stock to a charity. 7 1 He desig-
nated that his donated shares be placed into a fund bearing his name.272 Prior
to the dividend, each share of stock had a value of $100.272 After the declara-
tion of the dividend, the value of the stock increased by $1,500, the amount of
the dividend, to $1600.74 The taxpayer claimed a charitable deduction for the
262. 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989).
263. Id. at 646.
264. Id. The preferred stock was callable at $100 per share, with thirty days notice. Id. at 645.
265. Id. at 646.
266. Id. at 645.
267. Id. at 647.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. The dividend was in the amount of $1,500 per share.
271. Id.
272. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 1129, 1131 n.6 (N.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd. 865
F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989).
273. Since the stock was callable at $100, the value of the stock could not be more than $100.
Brief for Appellant at 10 n.8, Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989) (No.
88-1015). Also, the value of the stock with the dividend was $1600 per share, which included the
$1500 dividend. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 648. This establishes that the value of the stock before the
dividend was $100.
274. 865 F.2d at 648.
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fair market value of the stock, $1,600,000,275 almost all of which was attribu-
table to the $1,500,000276 dividend. However, the taxpayer did not include any
of the dividend in income because he was not the shareholder of record on
May 9.277
Two months later, the charity that had received the stock asked the tax-
payer if he knew of anybody that would be willing to buy the stock. 78 Nine
months later, the taxpayer told the charity that he could not find a buyer but
that he would buy the stock back himself for $100 per share. The charity sold
the stock back to the taxpayer for $100 per share. 70
The IRS imposed a tax deficiency on the taxpayer for the amount of the
dividend.2 80 The taxpayer paid the amount under protest and filed suit for
refund of the taxes paid under protest. 8
The IRS conceded the legitimacy of the deduction, but argued that the tax-
payer had to include the amount of the $1,500,000 dividend in income. Ac-
cording to the assignment of income doctrine, the dividend was earned while in
the taxpayer's hands.2 82 The IRS treated the dividend as being a separate as-
set apart from the stock. It argued that the taxpayer diverted some of his
income into preferred stock by declaring a dividend that raised the value of
the stock. He then gave away the stock "pregnant" with dividend.28 This had
the effect of shifting the income of the taxpayer to the tax-exempt charity.28'
The taxpayer responded that the stock and dividend were one indivisible
appreciated asset, and since he gave away that asset without realizing the in-
come, he should not have had to pay tax on the dividend.2 85
B. Court's Holding
The district court held that the taxpayer was not taxable on the dividend
paid to the charity.2 8  The court relied primarily on Estate of Putnam to find
that the taxpayer had no vested right in the dividend until the record date.2 87
275. This figure is the result of the following calculation: $1600 per share x 1000 shares. As a
result of the restrictions on charitable deductions imposed by § 170(b)(1), the taxpayers were only
allowed to deduct $404,775 of the $1,600,000 contribution on their 1978 tax return. The remain-
ing contribution was carried over to subsequent years. The taxpayer was allowed to deduct
$844,609 in 1979, $250,101 in 1980, and $100,515 in 1981. Brief for Appellant at 6 n.6, Caruth
Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-1015).
276. This figure is the result of the following calculation: $1500 per share x 1000 shares.
277. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 648.
278. Id. at 647.
279. Id. at 647-48.
280. Id. at 648.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 646.
283. Id. at 649.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 646.
286. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1987), affd. 865 F.2d 644
(5th Cir. 1989).
287. Id. at 1133. The court found that the "leading case concerning a gratuitous assignment of
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According to the court, the taxpayer had merely transferred an appreciated
asset and, under Blair v. Commissioner, the transfer of an entire interest in
property shifts the tax burden on future income to the donee. 88 The court
distinguished the liquidation cases289 on the basis that those cases concerned
shareholders who acquired an absolute and unqualified right to the liquidation
proceeds when the plan of liquidation was adopted.290
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 91 The court ruled
that the taxpayer merely gave away an asset that had appreciated in value,
rather than an asset (stock) accompanied by earned income (dividends). 29 2
The court found that pursuant to both Texas law and federal tax law, a divi-
dend does not vest until the record date.29 Since the taxpayer gave away the
asset before the record date, he did not have to include the dividend in income.
The court began its analysis stating that "[iln general, dividend income is
taxed to the shareholder who, on the record date, owns the stock with respect
to which dividends are paid and who is entitled to receive the dividend. 219
The court relied on Estate of Putnam for this general proposition. Therefore,
according to the court, the IRS must find some exception to the rule in order
to tax the donor on the dividend.2 9 The court determined that neither the
assignment of income doctrine nor the substance over form doctrine applied in
this case.296
1. Assignment of Income Doctrine
The court ruled that the assignment of income doctrine did not apply. The
court reasoned that the taxpayer never enjoyed any legal right to the dividend
because this right does not occur until the record date.297 Since the taxpayer
gave away the income-producing property (the stock), he was no longer liable
for the tax on the future dividend. The charity earned the income because it
received the dividend. With respect to Texas state law, the court relied solely
on the corporate statute that allows a corporation to establish a record date
that determines who is entitled to receive the income.29 The court read this
statute as support for the proposition that a dividend vests on the record date.
dividend income is Estate of Putnam." Id. (citation omitted).
288. Id. at 1134; see supra note 71 (discussing Blair v. Commisioner).
289. Caruth, 688 F. Supp. at 1135-36 (referring to Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. United States, 592
F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1979); Jones v. United States, 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976); Kinsey v. Com-
missioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973); Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir.
1972)); see supra notes 117-46 and accompanying text (discussing the liquidation cases).
290. Caruth, 688 F. Supp, at 1136.
291. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989).
292. Id. at 651.
293. Id. at 649.




298. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.26(A) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1990)).
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The court distinguished Estate of Smith on the grounds that, under the state
law in that case, a dividend explicitly vested on the declaration date. 99
With respect to federal tax law, the court relied on both Revenue Ruling
82-11 and Estate of Putnam in support of the proposition that the dividend
vested on the record date.300 Revenue Ruling 82-11 held that the shareholder
on the record date is entitled to receive the dividend.301 Estate of Putnam held
that a dividend does not accrue on the declaration date because the share-
holder did not have a fixed and determined right to the dividend.30 2
2. Substance Over Form
The court also rejected the substance over form doctrine. 303 The IRS offered
several arguments in support of its position. It first argued that there was no
legitimate business purpose for a closely held corporation with only three
shareholders to set a record date. 04 The court disagreed. The district court
found that a valid business purpose existed in that the taxpayer wanted to
encourage his nephews to sell their stock. 09 The time period between the dec-
laration and record dates gave the nephews an opportunity to sell the stock
and realize capital gain rather than ordinary dividend income. 0 6 The court
found clear supports for these findings and, therefore, affirmed them.3 07
The court also rejected the IRS's other arguments. The court dismissed as
irrelevant the fact that the taxpayer had control over the corporation, 308 that
the corporation had a right to redeem the preferred shares,3 0 9 and that the
taxpayer eventually bought back the stock from the charity. 10
The court, therefore, held that the general rule applied: a dividend vests on
the record date. Since the IRS did not prove an exception to the rule, the
taxpayer was not required to pay tax on the dividend.
299. Id.; see supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text (discussing Estate of Smith).
300. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1989).
301. Rev. Rul. 82-11, 1982-1 C.B. 51, 52 ("shareholder does not become entitled to a dividend
• . . until the record date").
302. Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 393, 396 (1945).
303. Caruth. 865 F.2d at 650.
304. Id.
305. Id. The taxpayer had not been getting along with his nephews and he felt that the corpo-
ration would run better if the problems with his nephews could be solved.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. The court stated that Caruth's control did not deprive the preferred shares of their
status as an income-producing asset.
309. Id. The court reasoned that since the corporation had to give the shareholders thirty days
notice before it could redeem the shares, the taxpayer was powerless to interfere with the charity's
right to receive the dividend.
310. Id. The court accepted the district court's finding that there had been no repurchase
agreement between Caruth and the charity at the time of the donation.
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III. ANALYSIS
The court in Caruth concluded that the taxpayer transferred an appreciated
asset rather than an asset accompanied by earned income. " ' This decision was
based on the finding that the right to the dividend arose on the record date.8"'
It emphasized that the taxpayer gave away the "tree," and thus, should be
relieved of the tax liability. 1 8 The court, however, failed to adequately analyze
who "earned"8'' the income. It is well settled that the transfer of the income-
producing property shifts the tax burden on the future income to the donee. 31'
The focus, however, should be whether the declared dividend constituted
earned income which is taxable to the donor/taxpayer.
Determining who earned a dividend is not as straightforward as other areas
of tax law. Income from services is earned by the taxpayer who performed the
services3 11 Income from property is usually earned by some specific event that
creates the right to the income.117 Although a dividend is income from prop-
erty, there are two possible dates at which time the income might be consid-
ered earned: the declaration date and the record date. Two other areas dealing
with the transfer of stock, liquidations,8 18 and mergers,1 9 similarly involve two
possible times when income could be earned. In both of these situations, the
courts have decided that the income from the stock is earned on the earlier
date because it is at that time the right to the income arises.
A. Caruth Erroneously Ruled that Dividend is Vested on Record Date
The Caruth court based its decision on the erroneous belief that a dividend
vests on the record date.82° The court erred in applying both federal and state
law.
The owner of the stock in a corporation has many rights.8 21 Prior to the
declaration of a dividend, however, the shareholder has no right to receive any
distribution of profits in the form of dividends. Whereas, once a corporation
declares a dividend, a debtor/creditor relationship is created between the cor-
311. Id. at 651.
312. Id. at 649.
313. Id.
314. Recall that income is "earned" if its realization "has become sufficiently proximate in
time, or in likelihood, that the donor of the right to receive it cannot escape taxation." See supra
notes 162-63 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 120, at 694 n.64.
315. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940).
316. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. I11, 115 (1930); see supra note 34 and'accompanying text.
317. See Estate of Applestein v. Commisioner, 80 T.C. 331, 344-45 (1983). The court noted
that the "donor remains liable for the tax on income later received by the donee where the occur-
rence of a specific event with respect to that property creates the right to the income." Id.
318. See supra notes 117-46 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
320. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1989).
321. For example, the owner of preferred stock may have the right to vote, the right to accu-
mulate unpaid dividends in arrears, the right to convert the stock to common stock, the right to a
share of assets upon liquidation, and the right to dividends if and when declared.
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poration and each shareholder under the laws of most states. 22 On the decla-
ration date, the corporation records the liability on its books and reduces the
amount of retained earnings under general accounting principles. s2 This di-
vides the corporation's assets into the assets that it will retain, and those that
it is bound to pay. 2 4 Since each shareholder is now in the same position as a
creditor, the dividend is irrevocable and must be paid.325 The Caruth court
failed to recognize that because the corporation is legally bound to pay the
dividend, the right to the dividend is created on the declaration date, and
therefore the donor should have been taxed on the dividend.
Generally, the gift of income-producing property shifts the tax burden to the
donee under the assignment of income doctrine.3 26 Any income already earned
at the time of the gift, however, is taxed to the donor even though it is re-
ceived by the donee. 32 1 Income, once earned, is taxed to the earner and tax
liability cannot be avoided by transferring the income-producing property at
the same time. Thus, the question in Caruth should not have been, as the
court believed, whether the income-producing property was transferred, but
rather whether the income had already been earned at the time of the transfer.
Determining when a dividend is "earned" depends upon consideration of
two possible dates: the declaration date and the record date. Income from
property is generally taxed to the owner of the property once the right to the
income is created.32 8 Since the right to the dividend is created on the declara-
tion date, the donor in Caruth should have been taxed on the dividend. The
court claimed that the right to the dividend vested on the record date under
both federal income tax law and Texas state law. 2 This assertion, however,
fails under analysis.
1. Caruth Erroneously Ruled that Dividend is Vested on Record Date under
Federal Law
Federal tax law does not create any rights, but rather attaches tax conse-
quences to rights created under state law. " Thus, Treasury Regulation 1.61-
9(c), which governs the sale of stock, does not mean that the right to the
dividend is created on the record date. Instead, this regulation means only that
a buyer of stock in between the declaration date and the record date pays tax
on the dividend. 31 The right to the dividend is created on the declaration date,
322. See sources cited supra note 188 and accompanying text.
323. Commissioner v. Goldwyn, 175 F.2d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1949).
324. McKelvy v. United States, 478 F.2d 1217, 1234 (Ct. CI. 1973) (Skelton, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wheeler v. Northwestern Sleigh Co., 39 F. 347, 349 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1889)).
325. See sources cited supra note 188. The Caruth court conceded that a corporation could not
revoke the dividend once declared. 865 F.2d at 650.
326. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940).
327. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
328. Horst, 311 U.S. at 115
329. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1989).
330. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960).
331. Treas. Reg. § 1.61(9)(c) (as amended 1964).
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but the owner of the stock on that date is not taxed on the dividend if he sells
the stock before the record date.38 "
The court inappropriately relied on Estate of Putnam to support its position
that the right to the dividend is created on the record date.8 8 The Estate of
Putnam decision involved the question of when the dividend accrues, not when
it is earned or who should be taxed on the dividend."' The case dealt with the
application of section 42 of the Tax Code of 1938, which provided that upon
the death of the taxpayer, all amounts "accrued" at his death were included in
income on his last tax return.8 5 The court held that dividends did not accrue
on the declaration date within the meaning of section 42.886 The court itself
conceded that the concept of "accrue" is a separate question from when the
right to receive the income is created.8 7 As the court in Estate of Smith
pointed out, Estate of Putnam "indicate[d] merely that even if the [donors]
.. .had themselves retained the stock and received the dividends they would
properly have accounted for this income in the year of distribution rather than
the year of declaration. "888
Determining who earned dividend income does not depend on the time at
which the dividend accrues. Income is accrued when the right to income is
fixed and determined. With regard to dividends, Estate of Putnam held that
dividends do not accrue on the declaration date because the distributee is not
fixed and determined.8 9 Treasury Regulation 1.301-1(b) elaborated on Estate
of Putnam and established that dividends are accrued and taken into income
when they are received by the shareholder, regardless of the shareholders'
method of accounting. °0 This means that dividends have not yet accrued even
for the period between the record date and payment date since the shareholder
does not receive the dividend until the payment date. Under the theory of
Caruth, a donor who transfers stock with dividend after the record date, but
before payment, would not be taxable because the dividend is not yet accrued.
The donor, however, clearly is taxed on the dividend for stock transferred dur-
ing this period, even though the dividend is not yet accrued.34 1 Since it is pos-
sible for a taxpayer to be taxable on a dividend even though it has not yet
accrued, the time at which the dividend accrues is not a valid basis for deter-
mining who earned the income, and therefore, who should pay the tax on it.
Furthermore, Caruth's reliance on Estate of Putnam is inconsistent with the
case law treatment of contingent contracts at death. Since a contingent con-
332. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
333. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 649.
334. See supra notes 217-225 and accompanying text.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Estate of Putnam v. Commisioner, 324 U.S. 393, 396 n.3 (1945).
338. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 478, 480 (3d. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 967 (1962).
339. Estate of Putnam, 324 U.S. at 396 n.3.
340. Treas. Reg. 1.301-1(b) (as amended 1979).
341. Rev. Rul. 74-562, 1974-2 C.B. 28.
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tract is by definition not fixed and determined until it is complete, it does not
accrue until such contingency is satisfied.84 ' Thus, a contingent contract is not
included in the decedent's final tax return because it has not yet accrued. 848
Under the Caruth theory, a taxpayer who transfers a contingent contract
would not be taxed because the contingent contract has not yet accrued. A
taxpayer who donates a contingent contract, however, is clearly taxable on the
income.844 Thus, the fact that an item of income is excluded from the dece-
dent's tax return does not mean that the same item of income would escape
taxation if the taxpayer had not died but instead transferred the income.
For example, assume that a taxpayer entered into a contingent contract on
December 1st of year one that would not be completed until one month later
on January Ist of year two. If the taxpayer died on December 15th, the in-
come from the contingent contract would not be included in the decedent's
return because, pursuant to Estate of Putnam, it would not yet have accrued.
However, if instead the taxpayer lived and transferred the contingent contract
on December 15th to a donee, then the taxpayer would be taxed on the income
from the contract in year two. The fact that the contingent contract accrued
on January 1st of year two is irrelevant to determine who is taxed on the
income where the taxpayer transferred the contract. Similarly, the fact that
dividends do not accrue until their actual receipt should not mean that the
donor is relieved of tax liability if he transfers the stock before then.
The court also inappropriately relied on Revenue Ruling 82-11.3' 5 That
Ruling addressed the different issue of whether a corporate shareholder who
buys stock after the record date is entitled to claim a dividend received deduc-
tion. 46 The stock exchange rules, contrary to the federal tax law, provided
that the buyer was entitled to receive the dividend. The corporation claimed
the dividend received deduction because it was entitled to receive the dividend
342. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
343. Fehrman v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 37 (1938). In Fehrman, a decedent's commissions
salary was not ascertainable at death because it was based on net profits which weire calculated at
year end. The court held that the commissions were not included in the decedent's return under
I.R.C. § 42 (1934) because they were not accrued. Id. at 42. Clearly, the taxpayer would be taxed
on the commissions that he earned through his own efforts if he gave the commissions to a donee.
Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940). The only question was when the taxpayer would re-
port the income. See also Keck v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1969); Estate of Nilssen
v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 260 (D.C. Minn. 1971); Collins v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 382
(C.D. Cal. 1970), affid per curiam, 448 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1971).
344. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
345. Rev. Rul. 82-11, 1982-1 C.B. 51.
346. The dividend received deduction is a deduction allowed to corporations for dividends re-
ceived as shareholders in another corporation. I.R.C. § 243 (1988). The deduction eliminates, at
least partially, the double taxation on intercorporate dividends that would otherwise exist. Gener-
ally, the corporation is entitled to a deduction of 70% of the dividends received. Id. §243(a)(1). If
the tax-paying corporation owns more than 20% of the corporation issuing the dividend, then the
amount of the deduction is 80%. Id. §243(c). Furthermore, if the dividends are received by a
corporation which is part of the same affiliated group, then the tax-paying corporation is entitled
to a full 100% deduction. Id. §243(a)(3).
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under the stock exchange rules. Revenue Ruling 82-11 held that the stock
exchange rules do not take precedence over federal tax law as promulgated in
Treasury Regulation 1.61-9(c). ,17 Therefore, with transfers after the record
date, the seller is entitled to the dividend because he was the owner on the
record date, and the buyer is not entitled to claim a dividend received deduc-
tion regardless of the stock exchange rules.
The court quoted language from this Ruling to the effect that the holder of
the stock on the record date is entitled to receive the dividend. 48 This point is
not disputed. The fact that one person is entitled to receive income, however, is
not determinative of who pays the tax. In all assignment of income cases, the
donee is entitled to receive the income while the donor is taxable.3 49
Revenue Rulings in related areas imply that the right to the dividend vests
on the declaration date. Revenue Ruling 69-130,350 addressing redemptions of
stock by the corporation after the declaration of a dividend, held that a portion
of the redemption proceeds equivalent to the declared dividend is treated as a
dividend distribution.35' The Ruling stated that "[w]hen a dividend has been
declared the shareholders have an immediate vested right against the corpora-
tion in the capacity of creditors. Therefore, a dividend when declared becomes
the separate property of a shareholder entirely disconnected from the
stock." 52
Revenue Ruling 74-562 also implied that the right to the dividend vests on
the declaration date.853 The Ruling held that an estate that assigns stock after
the declaration date but before the payment date is taxable on the dividend.3 54
Although the Ruling is not dispositive because the declaration and record
dates fell on the same date, the Ruling supported its position by citing to Es-
tate of Smith. 55 Addressing the question of whether a dividend vests on the
declaration date or record date, the court in Estate of Smith held that the
right vests on the declaration date.356 In sum, both of these Rulings, while not
providing direct precedential value, suggest that the donor in Caruth should be
taxed.
2. Caruth Erroneously Ruled that Dividend is Vested on Record Date under
State Law
In Caruth, the court claimed that the right to the dividend vested on the
347. Rev. Rul. 82-11, 1982-1 C.B. 51, 52.
348. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1989).
349. For example, in the seminal case of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. I11, 114 (1930), the wife was
legally entitled to one half of her husband's salary. Id.
350. Rev. Rul. 69-130, 1969-1 C.B. 93.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Rev. Rul. 74-562, 1974-2 C.B. 28.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1961), cert denied, 368 U.S. 967
(1962); see supra note 241-44 and accompanying text.
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record date under Texas state law.357 In reality, under the state law of Texas,
the state of incorporation in this case, the dividend vests on the declaration
date. 58 In Texas, like most other states, the declaration of the dividend creates
a debtor/creditor relationship. 859 Thereafter, the shareholder has an irrevoca-
ble claim to the dividend. In support of its position, the court cited the Texas
statutes ° enabling corporations to set a record date. The Texas statute, how-
ever, merely states that the shareholder on the record date is entitled to re-
ceive the dividend.3"6 Most other states have essentially the same statute,36 2
including those states that provide that the dividend vests on the declaration
date.363 These statutes were created primarily to protect the corporation from
liability after payment.
In fact, the New Jersey statute in Estate of Smith provided that the share-
holder on the record date was entitled to the dividend.364 The court in that
case, however, ruled that the dividend vests on the declaration date because
the donor had a right to the dividend as of the declaration date, notwithstand-
ing that the donor had transferred. his shares and was, therefore, not entitled
to receive the dividend.3 65 Certainly, the fact that the donee is entitled to re-
ceive the dividend is irrelevant, because in all assignment of income cases, the
donee is entitled to receive the income.366 Similarly, the mere fact that the
state statute provides that the shareholder on the record date has legal title to
the dividend does .not mean that the right to the dividend is created on that
date or that a dividend has been earned.
Many state courts have held that a dividend vests on the record date.36" 7
Basing their decisions on the "Connecticut Rule," these courts adopted its re-
sult but failed to adopt its reasoning.36" Under Connecticut law, the debtor/
creditor relationship is created on the record date.36 These courts, therefore,
ignored the question of when a debtor/creditor relationship was created in
their respective states. As a result, the shareholder becomes a creditor of the
357. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1989).
358. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.26(A) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1990).
359. Commissioner v. Cohen, 121 F.2d 348, 349 (5th Cir. 1941); McKelvy v. United States,
478 F.2d 1217, 1235 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (Skelton, J., dissenting); Keller v. Keller, 135 Tex. 260, 266,
144 S.W.2d 308, 311 (1940).
360. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.26(A) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1990). The statute pro-
vides in relevant part: "For the purpose of determining shareholders entitled to ... receive a ...
dividend .... the board of directors of a corporation ... may fix in advance a date as the record
date for any such determination of shareholders .
361. Id.
362. See 7 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 183, § 141-04[1], at 141-44 n.13.
363. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-7 (West 1969 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 604
(McKinney 1986).
364. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:5-3 (West 1939).
365. See supra notes 241-44.
366. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
368. Note, supra note 25, at 438.
369. Richter & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 A. 600 (1922).
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corporation on the declaration date, although in these states the dividend is
said to vest on the record date.370
Despite the lack of a sound theoretical basis, these cases still do not support
the Caruth court's decision. These decisions all dealt with the separate ques-
tion of to whom the dividend was payable. Since the whole purpose of the
record date is to establish to whom the dividends are payable, these decisions
are entirely logical in their holding that the shareholder on the record date is
entitled to receive the dividend. These decisions, however, only determine to
whom the dividend is payable, and not when the right to the dividend was first
created.
The Connecticut state court in Richter suggested that the corporation's
board of directors should be free to adopt a date upon which the corporation's
liability should begin. 7 1 This reasoning, however, is specious. A corporation
cannot decide when it will become liable for the dividend, and correspond-
ingly, when the shareholder becomes a creditor. State law determines when
the corporation's liability begins. In most states, the declaration of a dividend
creates a liability to each shareholder. Once the right has ripened under state
law, there is nothing the corporation can do to change the time when the right
shall begin to exist.3 72
The fact that the legal title or ownership attaches to the dividend on the
record date is of no consequence.8 73 In Estate of Applestein, the donor had a
right to merger proceeds before he obtained legal title to the merger proceeds
on the effective date of the merger.37 4 Similarly, the shareholders in the liqui-
dation cases-Hudspeth, Kinsey, and Jones-had a right to the liquidating
proceeds before legal title to the proceeds arose.375 Therefore, the precise time
at which the stockholder acquires legal title is irrelevant in determining when
the dividend should be considered earned.
3. The Proper Analysis
The creation of the right to the dividend does not depend on the refinements
of legal title, but on the status of the shareholders. As one commentator has
370. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
371. Richter & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 A. 600 (1922); see also Note, supra note 25,
at 439 ("While it is probable that the real intent on the part of the board of directors in making
dividends payable on a record date is to protect the corporation, there is no reason why the record
date cannot also be adopted as the date upon which the title to a dividend will vest.").
372. Note, supra note 193, at 83.
373. Justice Holmes' comment in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930), is appropriate here:
But taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual
command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid ....
The income that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to
enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to
enjoy it or not.
Id. at 377.
374. Estate of Applestein v. Commisioner, 80 T.C. 331, 345 (1983).
375. See supra notes 122-46 and accompanying text.
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stated, "the rights between the parties should depend upon the ownership of
the stock at the time when the corporation becomes a debtor for the divi-
dend." '76 On the declaration date, all indications are that the shareholder has
a vested right to the dividend for tax purposes. First, the corporation must pay
the dividend, or else the shareholder can sue to recover it. The Caruth court
itself conceded that a corporation cannot revoke a dividend once it is de-
clared.37 7 The declaration of the dividend separates an amount to be paid to
each shareholder from the corporation's earnings.3 78 One court has noted that
"[tihe stockholder receives the value of a dividend when it is declared, for if it
is immediately paid he has his stock and his dividend, and if payment is de-
ferred he has the value of his stock increased by the amount of the dividend
upon it."" 9 No one can divest the shareholder of the dividend without his
consent. No further action is required by the shareholders, board of directors,
or any other party to create the right to the dividend. In short, once a dividend
is declared, the shareholder is guaranteed that the dividend will be paid. Like
the shareholder in Estate of Applestein, "[a]ll the [donor] had to do was to
allow the stock to sit in [his] custodial account[] for a day or two and then
hold out [his] cap to receive the proceeds."3' 80
In this respect, the shareholder on the declaration date is in essentially the
same position as other income earners who are guaranteed to receive money in
the future. Consider the following hypothetical. On January 1st, an employer
gives an employee a note which entitles the holder to the amount of one
month's salary on February Ist. The employee gives the note to a donee on
January 2nd. Assume that the assignment is legal under state law so that the
donee is entitled to receive the salary. On January 1st, a debtor/creditor rela-
tionship is created between the employer and the note holder (the employee
here). In this situation, the distributee is unknown until February 1st. It is on
this date that the employer ascertains who to pay. Also, legal title to the in-
come does not attach to the holder until February 1st. Yet, it is clear that the
employee, rather than the donee, would be taxed under assignment of income
principles because he earned the income. In fact, this hypothetical is merely
the Lucas v. Earl case revisited.3 81
Now consider similar facts applied to dividends. Assume that on the decla-
ration date the corporation gives the shareholder a note entitling the holder on
376. Note, supra note 188, at 247.
377. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 1989).
378. McKelvy v. United States, 478 F.2d 1217, 1234 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (Skelton, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wheeler v. Northwestern Sleigh Co., 39 F. 347, 349 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1889)).
379. Commissioner v. Cohen, 121 F.2d 348, 349 (5th Cir. 1941). Although the holding of the
case, that dividends accrue on the declaration date for purposes of including them in the dece-
dent's last tax return, has been overruled by Estate of Putnam, the statements made by the court
concerning the status of the shareholder continue to have vitality.
380. Estate of Applestein v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 331, 345 (1983).
381. In Lucas, the wife was legally entitled to receive half of her husband's salary if and when
he earned compensation income. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930). The court held that the
husband was taxable despite these "attenuated subtleties" because he earned the income. Id.
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the record date to the dividend. This makes the shareholder a creditor of the
corporation. The shareholder then transfers the stock and the note to a donee.
This scenario is analogous to the previous hypothetical. Notwithstanding that
the donee, as holder on the record date, is paid the dividend, the donor should
be taxed because he assigned the right to income to the donee. The share-
holder is in the same position as any other creditor 83 that assigns its claim
against the corporation to a donee.383
The proper analysis for determining when the right to the dividend vests for
federal income tax purposes is to first look to state law to determine when the
debtor/creditor relationship arises. In virtually all states (including Texas, the
state law at issue in Caruth), this occurs on the declaration date. 84 At this
point the shareholder obtains a right to the dividend. Under federal tax law,
the dividend should be treated as vested on that date. If the donor gives the
stock, along with this right, to a donee before the record date, then this donee
is entitled to receive the dividend if he continues to hold the stock on the
record date. However, the shareholder on the declaration date should still be
taxed on the dividend because he had a right to the dividend at the time of the
gift and transferred this right.
In states such as Connecticut, the shareholder does not become a creditor of
the corporation until the record date. 385 Consequently, the right to the divi-
dend is created on the record date. This is the critical distinction between
Richter and the cases that have applied its reasoning. In the interest of uni-
formity, however, a bright-line rule is needed. In virtually all states, the
debtor/creditor relationship is created on the declaration date. Therefore, the
rule that the dividends are earned on the declaration date should be adopted
uniformly for all dividends.
The Caruth court ultimately misunderstood the nature of the shareholder's
status. Under the court's view, the right to the dividend is created on the rec-
ord date.386 The gift of the stock prior to that date would relieve the transferor
of the tax on the dividend because he never had the right to receive it. This
view fails to recognize the shareholder's rights to the dividend prior to the
record date. The alternative view is that the right to the dividend is created on
the declaration date. The gift of the stock before the record date is a transfer
of both the stock and the guaranteed right to receive the dividend. Thus, the
382. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123, 126-27 (1919). The
Court noted that "here the [stockholder] is pursuing a right to recover, which is not affected by its
relation to the corporation as a stockholder. The declaration of the dividends ... gave it the status
of a creditor ... and, thereafter, the right to recover was unaffected by any stockholder relation."
Id. at 126. The Court emphasized that "[tihe [stockholder] is not suing as a stockholder; it is
suing as a creditor." Id. at 127.
383. A regular creditor that assigns the right to receive the debt proceeds is clearly taxed on
the proceeds even if the right to the proceeds is contingent.
384. See sources cited supra note 188.
385. Richter & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 A. 600 (1922).
386. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Caruth never enjoyed
any legal right to the dividend .... [T]he right to dividends vests as of the record date.").
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donor should be taxed on the dividend under the principles of Horst.
While the difference in these two views produce different tax consequences
for the gift of stock, both views produce the same tax consequences for the sale
of stock. Under either view, the buyer is taxed on the dividend when he buys
the stock between the declaration date and the record date pursuant to Trea-
sury Regulation 1.61-9(c). Since the parties generally adjust the selling price
of the stock to reflect the value of the dividend,3 87 it would be unfair to tax the
seller on both the dividend and the full amount of the sales proceeds. Upon a
sale, the seller has fully realized his income,38 8 in the form of the sale pro-
ceeds, and the buyer acquires the right to the dividend. Consequently, Trea-
sury Regulation 1.61-9(c) provides that the buyer, and not the seller of the
stock, pays the tax on the dividend."
Since the seller does not pay the tax on the dividend when the stock is sold,
one might ask why there should be a distinction between sales and gifts.390 In
both situations, the transferor has realized the income: in a sale, the seller's
realization of the income is in the form of the sale proceeds; in a gift, the
donor's realization, according to the teaching of Horst, is in the form of an
intangible satisfaction associated with making a gift.391 Since a donor theoreti-
cally realizes the dividend income the same as a seller at the time of the trans-
fer, the question arises as to why the donor should be taxed on the dividend.
The answer is that a donor realizes the income from the dividend when the
dividend is received by the donee,3 93 while a seller realizes the sale proceeds he
receives at the time of the transfer. 9 " As mentioned above, it would be unfair
for the seller to pay tax on both the sales proceeds and again on the dividend.
Therefore, Regulation 1.61-9(c) relieves the seller of the tax liability.
This distinction between sales and gifts is followed in other areas. Generally,
the taxpayer who sells earned income pays tax on the sale proceeds and is
387. 7 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 183, § 141.04[3], at 141-53.
388. Interestingly, the sales proceeds are treated by the seller as a capital gain rather than as
ordinary income where sold between the declaration and record date. Treas. Reg. 1.61-9(c) (as
amended 1964). Under the P.G. Lake doctrine, a sale that is a substitute for ordinary income will
cause the sale proceeds to be taxed as ordinary income rather than as a capital gain. In this
respect, the tax law in this area ignores the sale of the right to the dividend from the seller to the
buyer and gives the seller capital gain treatment for the entire gain on the sale. Fed. Tax. Coordi-
nator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) J-2708. This rule is grounded in administrative convenience. B. BITT-
KER & J. EUSTIcE, supra note 72, 7.07, at 7-46. It allows shareholders a grace period between
the declaration date and the record date where the shareholder can sell the stock and still receive
capital gain treatment. In this manner, Regulation 1.61-9(c) provides certainty in the complex
area of traded securities.
389. Treas. Reg. 1.61-9(c) (as amended 1964).
390. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between sales
and gifts).
391. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
392. Since the gift itself is not taxable under § 102, the taxable event occurs when the donee
receives the dividend. See supra note 58.
393. The sales proceeds are realized under § 1001(b) and the amount in excess of the tax-
payer's basis is included in income under § 61(a)(3).
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relieved of the tax liability on the income when it is collected. 94 For example,
in Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, who sold the right to
future undeclared dividends but retained the underlying stock, was not taxable
on the future dividend." Similarly, in Cotlow v. Commissioner, a taxpayer
who sold the rights to previously earned insurance commissions was not held
taxable on the commissions. 98 If the taxpayers in both of these cases had
donated instead of sold the right 'to the income, then they would have re-
mained taxable on the income.89 7 Thus, the fact that the seller of stock be-
tween the declaration date and record date does not pay tax on the dividend
does not end the analysis. Whenever a taxpayer sells the right to income, he
realizes the income at the time of the sale instead of when the income is re-
ceived by the buyer. Therefore, the taxpayer is not taxable when the income is
collected.
B. Right to Dividend is Sufficiently "Ripened" on Declaration Date
Even if the court was correct in determining that the dividend vests on the
record date, the donor in Caruth should have remained taxable on the divi-
dend because it was "earned"8" on the declaration date. The right to the divi-
dend, even if not fixed and vested, had sufficiently matured on the declaration
date.
1. Income Can Be Earned Before It Is Vested
The court ruled that the right to the dividend vests on the record date.899
The court found this to be conclusive and ended further analysis. In analogous
cases, however, income is often earned before it becomes fixed and absolute.
The right to proceeds from a contingent contract becomes fixed when the con-
tract is complete. However, the income from the contract is earned at an ear-
lier time, the time when the services were actually performed under the con-
tract. 00 Similarly, the right to liquidation proceeds becomes fixed when all
assets are sold and the corporation is ready to make the final distribution. The
income is earned, however, when the corporation adopts a plan of liquidation,
and the right to the liquidation proceeds arises.01 In Estate of Applestein, the
right to the merger proceeds became fixed on the effective date of the merger.
394. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
395. Estate of Stranahan v. United States, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
396. Cotlow v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1956).
397. Hyman v. Nunan, 143 F.2d 425 (2d. Cir. 1944) (holding donor taxable on dividends
where donor donated right to future dividends-but retained ownership of the stock); Helvering v.
Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940) (holding donor taxable on insurance commissions gratuitously
transferred).
398. See supra notes 162-63 (discussing the concept of "earned").
399. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1989).
400. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
401. Note, supra note 120, at 694 ("[L]iquidation proceeds are, in effect, 'earned' at the time
the shareholders of a corporation vote to liquidate.").
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The court, however, considered the merger proceeds earned when the share-
holders approved the merger agreement. 0 2 In all of these merger and liquida-
tion cases, the donors transferred the right to income before the right was
absolutely fixed, but they were still taxed on the income, despite the lack of
absolute certainty, because they had earned it.
Determining when dividend income is earned is a difficult matter. In the
liquidation and merger cases, cases dealing with income from stock, the in-
come was considered earned at the time the right to the income arose, rather
than the time when the income was absolutely fixed.4 " Applying this reason-
ing to the dividend in Caruth, the dividend was earned on the declaration date,
because on this date, the shareholder had a right as a creditor to the dividend.
2. A Practically Certain Right Is Sufficiently Ripened
The level of certainty in the right to the income is crucial to determining
whether the donor should be taxed. Generally, if a donor makes a gift of a
relatively uncertain right to income, the donor is not taxed on the income.04
Thus, where a donor makes a gift of a lottery ticket that turns out to be a
winning ticket, he is not taxed on the income because the right was too uncer-
tain at the time of the gift.'10 Similarly, a taxpayer who assigns the rights in a
lawsuit before the case is adjudicated is not taxed on the judgment award if it
is too uncertain at the time of the gift. 08
At the other end of the spectrum, an assignment of a certain right to income
does not shift the tax burden.' 07 Clearly, where the right to income is already
fixed and absolute, the donor cannot avoid the tax liability by means of a
tranfer. This is the essence of the assignment of income doctrine. This also
holds true, however, in situations where the right is not quite fixed and abso-
lute, but is "practically certain" to be realized. 40 8
The liquidation cases held that the donor is taxed when he transfers a
"practically certain" right to income.0 9 In these cases, the taxpayer donated
402. See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 120-21, 150-53 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
405. Id.
406. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
407. E.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (holding donor that transferred right to
interest on bond taxable on the interest).
408. To modify the court's own "golden-egg" metaphor, see Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865
F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1989), imagine a gander that lays eggs which are guaranteed to hatch
into healthy goslings. In this scenario, the property is the "gander" and the income is the "gos-
ling." If the owner donates the gander before it lays an egg, then the donor should not be taxed on
any future goslings. This transaction is equivalent to a taxpayer donating stock before the declara-
tion date. However, if the owner donates the gander after it lays an egg, then the donor should be
taxed on the gosling. Since the egg was guaranteed to hatch, the owner "derived money's worth"
by selling the gander and the egg for the price of two geese. Similarly, a stockholder who donates
stock after the declaration date and before the record date should be taxed on the dividend be-
cause the dividend is guaranteed to be paid.
409. Jones v. United States, 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976); Kinsey v. United States, 477 F.2d
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stock to a donee after the corporation adopted a plan of liquidation but before
the right to the liquidation proceeds was fixed and absolute. The liquidation
was theoretically revocable by the shareholders at the time of the gift. The
courts chose to examine the "realities and substance" of the transaction rather
than remote possibilities. These courts held that since the liquidation was
practically certain to occur, the right to the liquidation proceeds had "suffi-
ciently ripened" to the extent that the donor could not escape the tax
liability.41 0
It must be emphasized that since the liquidation plan was revocable by the
shareholders, the shareholders did not have a fixed and absolute right to the
liquidating proceeds until all of the assets were actually sold. Nevertheless, the
donor was taxable on the proceeds where he transferred the stock after the
corporation adopted the plan of liquidation.
Similarly, Estate of Applestein held that the gift of stock after the share-
holder approved a merger agreement but before the effective date of the
merger did not shift the tax burden because the merger was practically certain
to occur.411 The court stated that, generally, "the donor remains liable for the
tax on income later received by the donee where the occurrence of a specific
event with respect to that property creates the right to the income at the time
of the transfer . . . . In such cases, the 'fruit had ripened' before the
transfer.1 412
The reasoning of the liquidation and merger cases should be applied to the
transfer of stock with dividend between the declaration and record dates. In
applying this reasoning, the donor should be taxed because he had a suffi-
ciently ripened right to receive income and gave this right to the donee. A
dividend, once declared, is even more certain than a liquidation or merger to
be completed. As the Caruth court conceded, a corporation cannot revoke the
payment of a dividend once it is declared.' 18 If the corporation does not pay
the dividend, the shareholders can sue the corporation in the capacity of credi-
tors."4 Also, the record date is usually a short time after the declaration
date.415 In Caruth, the record date was only seven days after the declaration
date.416 In contrast, the payment of the liquidating proceeds can occur up to
1058 (2d. Cir. 1973); Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972); see supra notes
122-46 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 117-46 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
412. Estate of Applestein v. Commisioner, 80 T.C. 331, 344-45 (1983) (citations omitted) (cit-
ing Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1961) (holding donor who transferred
stock after declaration date but before record date taxable on the dividend)).
413. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 650.
414. See supra notes 119, 122 and accompanying text.
415. 7 Z. CAVITCA. supra note 183, § 141.04[3], at 141 (stating that modern practice is to set
the declaration, record, and payment dates close together).
416. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 647. The declaration date was on May 8, 1978, the record date was
on May 15, 1978, and the payment date was on May 17, 1978.
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twelve months after the adoption of the plan of liquidation. 1 7 The contingency
involved with declared dividends is not that they might not be paid, but that
legal title does not attach to the dividends until the record date. Thus, the
contingency is not in the existence or certainty of the dividend. Instead, the
contingency relates to the mere passage of time.
When income is practically certain to occur, the same justifications exist to
tax the taxpayer as exist when the income is absolutely certain to occur. A
person who has earned income is taxed on the income because he is the one
who realizes the benefits of the income." 8 In terms of the Horst decision, the
enjoyment of the income is realized whether the taxpayer makes a gift of the
income, or alternatively, collects the income and then disposes of it. 4" 9 Simi-
larly, even though the shareholder does not have a fixed and absolute right
regarding liquidations, the shareholder also "enjoys" the income when he
makes a gift of the stock."2" The court in Hudspeth v. United States reasoned
that the shareholder who donated his stock to a charity after the plan of liqui-
dation was adopted, but before the right was absolute, "procure[d] the satis-
faction of his desire to the same extent as if he had first received said proceeds
and then donated them.''
The taxpayer in Caruth certainly procured satisfaction from the dividend
income. Without the dividend, the stock had a value of $100.422 Since no other
dividend was ever declared in the history of the corporation, 23 the value of the
stock did not gradually increase over time in anticipation of a regular dividend
distribution. Rather, the stock's value remained constant until the declaration
of the $1500 per share dividend, which naturally increased the stock's value to
$1600.'' Thus, the taxpayer procured the satisfaction of making a $1600 gift
instead of a $100 gift. Furthermore, the taxpayer obtained the intangible satis-
faction of establishing a fund in his own name. Where a taxpayer is virtually
certain that income will be realized from his property and gives this property
away, he derives the satisfaction of making a gift of both the property and the
income.
417. Before it was changed in 1986, § 337 provided a liquidating corporation twelve months
after the plan of liquidation was adopted to sell all of its assets without recognizing gain or loss.
I.R.C. § 337 (1954).
418. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
419. Id. at 117; see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
420. Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275, 280 (8th Cir. 1972).
421. Id.
422. Like many closely held corporations, Caruth Corporation's stock did not have an ascer-
tainable market value. See Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1989).
Since the stock was callable at $100, Id. at 647, the stock's value without the dividend could not
be more than $100. See Brief for Appellant at 10 n.8, Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d
644 (5th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-1015).
423. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 647.
424. Id. at 648.
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C. Substance Over Form
While the preceding discussion focussed on the application of the assign-
ment of income doctrine in a general sense to all gifts of stock between the
declaration and record dates, the fact that the taxpayer in Caruth was a con-
trolling shareholder of a closely held corporation presents an even more com-
pelling case for taxing the donor.
The substance over form doctrine generally allows the IRS to ignore formal-
ities and assess taxes based on the economic reality of the transaction.4 2 5 The
court in Caruth focused on the fact that the record date was set by the corpo-
ration for a legitimate business purpose and ended further analysis.420 This,
however, ignores the realities of the transaction. In substance, the taxpayer
was looking for a way "to get money out of" the corporation because he was
planning to wind down operation of the corporation.427 He was aware of the
potential unfavorable impact of the accumulated earnings tax.42" The taxpayer
was allowed to divert some of the accumulated earnings of his corporation,
attach these earnings to the stock, and then transfer them to a charity tax-
free. This was accomplished by declaring a dividend and then transferring the
stock before the record date. As a result, the taxpayer claimed a charitable
deduction for the $1,500,000 dividend but did not include the dividend in
income.119
By having control over the corporation, the taxpayer had many options open
to his discretion, such as deciding when a dividend would be declared. Since
the stock contained a call provision,480 he could direct the corporation to buy
back any outstanding stock with thirty days notice. In addition, he could de-
termine the amount of the dividend. These factors demonstrate the large
amount of control the Caruth taxpayer had over the nature and extent of the
dividend income.
Similarly, the fact that North Park Corporation was a closely held corpora-
tion is significant. Because the corporation did not pay out regular divi-
425. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
426. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 650. The court ruled that the taxpayer directed the corporation to set
a record date in order to encourage his estranged nephews to sell their shares to him. Id. The IRS
contended that the setting of a record date could in no way serve to overcome the nephew's unwill-
ingness to sell their shares. Reply Brief for Appellant at 6 n.4, Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865
F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-1015).
427. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1989).
428. Id. The accumulated earnings tax, imposed by § 532, is designed to prevent corporations
from accumulating income in the corporation and thereby avoiding the taxation of a dividend to
the shareholders. To avoid the tax, corporations are only allowed to accumulate earnings to meet
reasonable needs and must distribute the rest. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 72,
8.02.
429. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 648.
430. Id. A call provision allows the corporation to redeem a shareholder's stock upon its discre-
tion. The stock in Caruth was callable at $100 and required the corporation to give the share-
holder 30 days notice prior to redeeming the stock. Id.
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dends,' 8' the value of the stock did not gradually increase in anticipation of
the record date. In fact, the corporation's stock, like most other stock not pub-
licly traded, did not even have a market valute before the dividend was de-
clared. 32 Once the dividend was declared, the value of the stock was ascer-
tained at $1600 per share, reflecting the $1500 dividend. 483 This principle is
important because it essentially prevented the taxpayer from accomplishing
the same result as that which occurred in the case by merely transferring the
stock one day before the declaration date. A transfer before the declaration
date would not accomplish the same result because the value of the stock did
not include the value of the dividend. Therefore, the taxpayer would not be
able to claim an enhanced charitable deduction. Thus, in closely held corpora-
tions where a dividend is not anticipated, the taxpayer can attach the amount
of the dividend on to the stock merely by declaring a dividend.
By exercising his control over the corporation, the taxpayer was able to as-
sign income to the charity. If he had donated his stock after the record date,
then he would have been able to claim the charitable deduction, but he would
have had to pay tax on the dividend. 4 4 Essentially, the taxpayer can deduct
the amount of the dividend and escape taxation on the dividend only during
the period between the declaration date and the record date. Since the tax-
payer had control over the corporation, he could determine when that period
would occur. He would essentially be able to enhance every charitable dona-
tion he made simply by declaring a dividend before he donated the stock. This
arrangemeat is especially poignant where the corporation is forced to make the*
donation for less philanthropic reasons, such as to avoid an impending accu-
mulated earnings45 tax or personal holding company tax.' 6
IV. IMPACT
The most direct impact of Caruth is that it will allow shareholders of closely
held corporations to enhance the value of a gift. In closely held corporations,
dividends usually are not paid regularly and, therefore, are not anticipated.' 37
As a result, once a dividend is declared, the value of the stock increases sud-
denly.' 88 For example, assume that the market value of preferred stock with-
431. Id. The dividend distribution at issue in the case was the only dividend the corporation
ever paid out.
432. See id. The taxpayer stated that since there was no one else in the market for the shares,
he would provide a market himself. Id.
433. Id.
434. Rev. Rul. 74-562, 1974-2 C.B. 28 (holding that donor who donates stock after record date
is taxable on.the dividend).
435. An example of this situation is the taxpayer in Caruth. He sought to avoid the unfavorable
impact of the accumulated earnings tax by distributing a dividend to the charity.
436. E.g., Estate of Smith, 292 F.2d 478 (3d. Cir. 1961) (holding that taxpayer made dividend
distribution to avoid the personal holdings tax).
437. See supra notes 395-96 and accompanying text.
438. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1989). The court observed
that "[wjith the declaration of a dividend, the asset appreciates suddenly, and then declines again
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out the dividend is $10, ' and the, corporation declares a $500 dividend, which
increases the value of the stock to $510.".4o If a shareholder wishes to make a
gift, he need only wait until a dividend is declared, or if he is a controlling
shareholder, he can direct the corporation to declare the dividend and then be
sure to transfer the stock before the record date. This will allow him to obtain
the benefit ""' of making a $510 gift without paying tax on the $500 dividend.
If the gift is to a charitable organization, he could then claim a charitable
deduction of $510.442
When a shareholder desires to make a donation, he is much better off do-
nating the stock during this period than selling the stock and donating the
proceeds. If he sells the stock, he must pay tax on any gain he realizes from
the sale. 448 If he donates the stock, not only is the dividend excluded from
income according to Caruth, but also the shareholder can claim a charitable
deduction, although this may be limited if the alternative minimum tax
applies."'
More importantly, Caruth permits shareholders to assign the right to divi-
dend income. This allows the shareholders to procure not only intangible bene-
fits, but also tangible economic benefits as well. Instead of donating the "preg-
nant" stock to a charity, the shareholder could transfer it to business
associates. For example, a controlling shareholder can transfer pregnant stock
to a creditor in satisfaction of a debt. Again, assume preferred stock is worth
$10 and a $500 dividend is declared, increasing the stock's value to $510.
Further assume that the shareholder owes a creditor $510. If the shareholder
is a majority shareholder, then he can arrange for the corporation to declare a
to its par value (or below) when the dividend issues." Id.
439. Since there is no ready market of buyers available, the value of the bare stock is necessa-
rily low. However, the value of all the corporation's stock should approximate the fair market
value of the corporation's assets. Eli Lilly & Co. v Commissioner, 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988);
see also Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 4 (1970) (holding that taxpayers who transferred
intangibles in exchange for stock received the equivalent of the corporation's assets).
440. The particular numbers used are not relevant. Any amounts would convey the same prin-
ciple that the shareholder can use the dividend income tax-free by having the power to dispose of
the income as he wishes.
441. The satisfaction could come through publicity, improved public relations, or simply the
philanthropic desire to make a gift. The taxpayer in Caruth, for example, designated that his
donated shares be placed into the "W.W. Caruth Jr. Fund." Caruth Corp. v. United States, 688
F. Supp. 1129, 1131 n.6 (N.D. Tex. 1987), ajf'd, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989).
442. This could be limited by the alternative minimum tax (AMT). I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (1988).
Congress enacted the alternative minimum tax in 1986 to prevent taxpayers from significantly
avoiding tax liability through use of tax preferences. AMT is only payable if it exceeds the tax-
payer's regular tax liability. AMT is calculated on the taxpayer's taxable income after certain
adjustments are made to reflect these tax preferences. One such adjustment is the appreciated
portion of property claimed as a charitable deduction. Id. § 57(a)(6). This may prevent the tax-
payer from receiving the benefit of a charitable deduction. B. BITTKER & J. EusTIcE. supra note
72, 5.08.
443. The gain realized on the sale of the stock is the amount realized of $510 less the share-
holder's basis in the stock.
444. See supra note 442.
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dividend at his convenience. The shareholder can then transfer a share of stock
to a creditor in satisfaction of the $510 loan balance. The creditor has no
complaints since his loan is paid. Yet, according to Caruth, the shareholder
does not pay tax on the $500 dividend. This allows him to extract money from
the corporation to pay off the $510 debt tax free. If the shareholder were
instead to sell the stock and then pay the creditor with the proceeds, he would
have to pay tax on any gain realized from the sale. " 5
Similarly, under Caruth, shareholders can purchase property with the preg-
nant stock. The value of the dividend attached to the stock would constitute
consideration for the purchase. Under the same facts as above, the shareholder
would be able to purchase a piece of property worth $510 by transferring a
share of stock between the declaration and record dates. Again, the share-
holder would not be taxed on the $500 dividend according to Caruth.
These examples demonstrate the irrationality of Caruth. The shareholder is
allowed to use the dividend income to his satisfaction without paying tax on it.
The reasoning of Horst precluded such a result. "Even though [the donor]
never receives the money, he derives money's worth from the disposition ....
The enjoyment of the economic benefit . . . is realized as completely as it
would have been if he had collected the interest in dollars and expended
them."446
More generally, Caru th may indicate a setback for the assignment of in-
come doctrine. The Fifth Circuit might not follow the holdings of other cir-
cuits in the liquidation cases. Instead, it could very well hold that a share-
holder is not taxable where it assigns stock after a plan of liquidation is
adopted. The decision might also affect the level of certainty required to hold
the donor taxable on income that is not fixed and absolute. Caruth might re-
quire an absolutely vested right while discarding the "practically certain" ap-
proach in the process.
V. CONCLUSION
Caruth held that a taxpayer who donates stock before the record date is not
taxable on the dividend. This approach is inconsistent with other areas involv-
ing the assignment of stock. It allows shareholders who are certain that a divi-
dend will be paid to derive a benefit by disposing of the dividend as they wish.
According to the assignment of income doctrine, this power to dispose of in-
come is grounds for tax liability.
The court'ignored the fact that once a dividend is declared, the shareholder
becomes a creditor of the corporation. As such, he should be treated as any
other creditor that transfers its claim against the corporation, and he should
be taxed on the dividend. The right to the dividend, therefore, arises on the
declaration date. It is true that the shareholder actually owning the stock on
the record date, not necessarily the shareholder on the corporate books, is enti-
445. The gain on the sale would be the $510 less the shareholder's basis in the stock.
446. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117 (1940).
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tied to receive the dividend. But the fact that one person is entitled to receive
income is not determinative of who pays the tax on it, according to the assign-
ment of income doctrine. Upon the.gift of the stock between the declaration
and record dates, the donor must pay the tax on the dividend even though the
donee receives the dividend. This rule will not affect the sale of stock during
the same period. Thus, upon the sale of the stock, the seller pays tax on the
sales proceeds realized from the sale while the buyer receives the dividend and
pays tax on it.""' These rules provide rational results for a "peculiar asset."
Nick Marsico
447. Treas. Reg. 1.61-9(c) (as amended 1964).
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